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ETHICAL LAWYERING AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF UNTEGRITY
Sharon Dolovich*
INTRODUCTION

What is involved in being an ethical lawyer? This, to my mind, is
the central question for those interested in understanding the
professional obligations of lawyers. But how to go about answering
it? The obvious first step is to try to explain what it is that ethical
lawyers do, how they respond to requests for assistance from current
or prospective clients, how they understand their obligations and how
they fulfill them.
The dominant model of ethical lawyering to emerge from efforts to
answer this question has been the traditional view of the lawyer as
zealous advocate, or, as William Simon puts it, "neutral partisan:" '
one who does whatever possible, within the bounds of the law, to
serve her client's interests regardless of what the lawyer herself thinks
of the client's ends. A neutral partisan, on this view, passes no
judgments; her zeal on behalf of the client is unmitigated and
noncontingent.
More recently, however, legal ethics scholars have begun to
challenge the hegemony of this model, advancing a different answer to
the question of what ethical lawyers do. For these critics, ethical
lawyering involves not the suspension of moral judgment but rather
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. I am grateful to
Rick Abel, Stuart Banner, Devon Carbado, David Dolinko, Jody Freeman, Bob

Gordon, Ken Klee, Russell Korobkin, Youngjae Lee, Steve Munzer, Bill Rubenstein,
Seana Shiffrin, Kirk Stark, and members of the Southern California Law &
Philosophy Group and the UCLA Junior Group for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. I also thank Paul Foust for his research help, Alicia Pell and
Shelley Cobos for their proofreading, and especially Jody Freeman, Deborah Rhode,
Seana Shiffrin, David Sklansky, Clyde Spillenger, and Ben Zipursky for their
encouragement and support.
In this paper, I construct an account of Rhode's view of ethical lawyering that
builds on the starting points she offers in her recent book. In filling out and
developing the picture as I understand it, I may well have strayed from the position
Rhode herself intended to endorse. The account I offer here must therefore be
understood to be my own interpretation of her model, and not necessarily that which
Rhode understands herself to have presented.
1. William Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, quoted in Deborah L. Rhode & David
Luban, Legal Ethics 89 (3d ed. 2001).
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the exercise of it, to determine what justice requires and thus the
nature and extent of the efforts the lawyer ought to exert on the
client's behalf. On this alternative view, lawyers cannot justify their
actions solely on the ground that it was in their clients' interests that
they act in this way, but must instead, as Deborah Rhode puts it, come
to take "personal moral responsibility for the consequences of their
professional acts." 2 Whereas the conventional view rejects as
inappropriate a lawyer's moral assessment of the client's interests and
ends, this latter view construes this assessment as central to the work
of an ethical lawyer.
Addressing these competing views is the first order of business for
anyone interested in figuring out what is involved in being an ethical
lawyer. There is, however, a second step in this inquiry, one which,
despite receiving considerably less attention from legal ethics
scholars,3 also bears examination if we are to have a complete account
of ethical lawyering. That is, we must ask: What are ethical lawyers
like? What traits of character do ethical lawyers possess that make
them able to fulfill their moral responsibilities? In this article, I seek
to show that any complete account of ethical lawyering needs a theory
of moral character. Moreover, I argue that the likelihood that the
traits of character on which ethical lawyering depends will be fostered
or undermined among individual lawyers will be determined to a great
extent by the shape of the institutional framework of legal practice. It
is for this reason, I conclude, that there can be no widespread moral
renewal across the profession without widespread structural reform,
reform that if it is to be effective must start by addressing the
prioritizing of profit that has come to define many institutions of legal
practice.
I develop this set of arguments through a focus on the model of
ethical lawyering advanced by Deborah Rhode in her recent book, In
the Interests of Justice. In this book, Rhode situates herself among
those legal ethics scholars who have challenged the standard zealous
advocacy model in favor of a more contextual approach.' In so doing,
she speaks directly to our first question of what ethical lawyers do.
Like other scholars who advance such views,' however, Rhode attends
2. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
17 (2000).
3. The notable exception here is Anthony Kronman. See generally Anthony T.
Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993) [hereinafter
Kronman, Lost Lawyer] (exploring the moral character of the ideal of "lawyerstatesman" and in particular the Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom which makes
possible the achievement of this ideal); see also Anthony T. Kronman, The Value of
Moral Philosophy, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1751 (1998) [hereinafter Kronman, Moral
Philosophy].
4. Rhode's commitment to this approach predates her recent book. See Deborah
L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,37 Stan. L. Rev. 589 (1985). On my
use of the term "contextual" to denote Rhode's model, see infra note 40.
5. See, e.g., David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988); William
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little if at all to the question of what character traits are necessary for
ethical lawyering. It is not that Rhode's account of ethical lawyering
is without a theory of moral character. To the contrary, as with all
accounts of ethical practice that do not directly address the question
of moral character, one finds in Rhode's model a tacit reliance on the
presence of a certain set of moral qualities in the lawyers to whom she
addresses herself, an unarticulated vision of the moral character of the
ethical lawyer. But this account remains below the surface, rendering
it inaccessible to critics and champions alike.
In what follows, I argue that the kind of person on which Rhode's
model implicitly relies for its success is a person who possesses the
traits of character that together comprise the moral quality commonly
associated with the most morally praiseworthy among us: the quality
of integrity. My argument proceeds in several steps. Because any
claim as to the character traits of an ethical lawyer will depend on the
conception of ethical lawyering being advanced, to make this case it is
first necessary to understand what it means to be an ethical lawyer on
Rhode's account-a task which in turn requires that we understand
the standard zealous advocacy model to which Rhode's model is a
reaction. For this reason, I explore in Part I the standard conception
of the lawyer's role, before turning to the task of articulating, in
somewhat more detail than Rhode herself offers, the alternative
framework for ethical lawyering Rhode advocates in its stead. My
aim in Part I is two-fold: to develop a critical understanding of each
framework, and to convey a sense of what Rhode's model demands of
the lawyers who would take it as a guide. In Part II, I provide a brief
philosophical exploration into the moral quality of integrity. This
excursion is necessary if I am to be able to demonstrate that integrity
is the quality on which Rhode's model implicitly depends for its
success. Then, armed with an understanding of the nature of integrity
itself, I return to Rhode's account to demonstrate the extent to which
the possibility of ethical lawyering as Rhode conceives it depends on
lawyers possessing the character traits that comprise integrity. Finally,
in Part III, I explore some of the implications of this dependence for
the structure of the legal profession itself, and in particular consider
what it suggests for those who wish to promote among lawyers the
practice of ethical lawyering the way Rhode and others 6 understand it.
I argue that although basic moral character is to some extent shaped
long before moral actors enter the legal profession, the institutional
structures and practices of the profession can nonetheless have a
significant influence on whether a lawyer's integrity is fostered or
undermined. In closing I identify an incompatibility between ethical
lawyering and an undue concern with maximizing profit, and argue
H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 9-11 (1998).
6. See eg., Luban, supra note 5; Simon, supra note 5.
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that engaging in this latter pursuit may undermine the very qualities of
integrity on which ethical lawyering on the contextual model depends
for its success.
I. ZEALOUS ADVOCACY AND RHODE'S ALTERNATIVE

A. The Standard View

In her recent book, Rhode reserves some of her harshest criticism
for the zealous advocacy
model of the lawyer's role. This model, the
"standard conception," 7 has at its core the view that a lawyer realizes
her professional obligations by remaining loyal to clients and
exhibiting "extreme partisan zeal" on behalf of their interests,
constrained only by the limits of the law.8

Notwithstanding that

achieving the interests of any given client may have serious negative
implications for innocent third parties or for the public at large, on
this view the loyalty and partisanship of zealous advocates must
nonetheless be unwavering. 9

It is a curious thing that on this standard view, the lawyer's role is at
the same time both amoral and highly ethical. It is amoral in the sense
that, however morally questionable the clients' ends and however
zealous the lawyer is in their pursuit, the lawyer is thought to bear no

moral responsibility for either the content of the ends or their
achievement." Although a basic assumption of ordinary morality is
that a person who acts knowingly and willingly to achieve an end is
7. Luban, supra note 5, at 7.
8. Id. at 50; see Rhode, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining that on this view, a
lawyer's "preeminent obligation is loyalty to client interests" and that "[eJxcept in
limited circumstances.., lawyers are to maintain clients' confidences and to pursue
their interests 'zealously within the bounds of the law"').
9. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 15. This view was eloquently expounded by Lord
Henry Brougham, who in 1820 asserted that:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and amongst them,
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction, which he may bring upon
others.
Rhode & Luban, supra note 1, at 186 (quoting 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J.
Nightingale ed. 1820-21)).
10. See Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2000) ("A lawyer shall abide by
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to [limited
exceptions]."); R. 1.2(b) ("A lawyer's representation of a client... does not constitute
an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities."); Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-7 (2000) ("[Subject to limited
exceptions,] the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if
made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer.");
EC 7-8 ("In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the
decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.").
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morally responsible for both the act and the end, the standard view of
the lawyer's role exempts lawyers from this judgment."' In part, the
idea behind this notion is that clients, if they are to achieve
permissible legal ends, need lawyers to help them navigate their way
through the system. 2 If lawyers were deemed morally responsible for
their clients' ends, they might decide to judge the worth of those ends
before agreeing to take the representation, 3 in which case individual
lawyers would be in the powerful position of deciding which legal
goals were worthy and which not, thus usurping the legislative and
judicial functions and denying clients the tools they need to vindicate
their legal rights. 4 To avoid this situation and to ensure that clients
retain autonomy over their own ends, the standard view relieves
lawyers of moral responsibility for actions taken on behalf of their
clients, instead conceiving of lawyers as "amoral technician[s], whose
peculiar skills and knowledge in respect to the law are available to
those with whom the relationship of client is established."' s As such,
lawyers are free-and, indeed, required-to express "indifference to a
wide variety of ends and consequences that in other contexts would be
of undeniable moral significance,"' 6 including possible harm to
innocent others or to the public at large.
Yet even while, on this standard view, lawyers enjoy a wholesale
exemption from moral judgment for actions taken in their
professional capacity, they are at the same time credited with a high
ethical purpose: that of ensuring, through the performance of their
role as "neutral partisans" for their clients, 7 the realization of
society's highest ends."8 We have already seen that the neutral
11. See Luban, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that, in addition to the -'principle of

partisanship,"' the standard conception of the lawyer's role also consists of the
"'principle of nonaccountability': 'When acting as an advocate for a client ...a lawyer
is neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means used or the
ends achieved'
(quoting Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669,673 (1978))) (omission in original).

12. For a clear articulation of this argument, see Stephen L Pepper, The Lawyer's
Amoral EthicalRol" Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities,1986 Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 613.
13. Or worse, they might decide to judge the worth of the client's ends during the
course of the representation, after the client has put their trust in the lawyer's word
that she is committed to helping the client get what he wants.
14. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5

Hum. Rts. 1 (1975). In the English system, barristers have traditionally subscribed to
the cab rank principle, on which clients, assuming they can pay, are assigned on a
first-come, first-served basis to the next available barrister who has subject matter
competence. This rule, when practiced, arguably avoids the possibility that lawyers
will select clients based on their personal perception of the worth of the client's aims.

See Richard Abel, American Lawyers 33 (1989).
15. Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 6.

16. Id.at 5.
17. See Simon, supra note 1, at 89.
18. I use this phrasing not to endorse the suggestion that these values are in fact

"society's highest ends" but in efforts to capture the flavor of justifications offered for
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partisan is thought to secure the public value of individual autonomy.
But there are several other values that are, on this view, thought to be
secured when lawyers play this role: the presumed products of our
adversary system, most central among them the discovery of truth and
the preservation of individual rights. 9 The argument tying these
values to the amoral role of the zealous advocate, like that offered
above with respect to client autonomy, is at base a consequentialist
one,20 and it runs as follows. The securing of these values-truth,
rights, justice, individual autonomy, etc. -is the central purpose of any
justice system. The mechanism through which these values are
achieved in the American system is the adversary process, a process in
which individual litigants are represented by lawyers who, each
playing the part of zealous advocate for their clients' interests, engage
in direct adversarial conflict with the other sides' lawyers. Placed
between the adversaries is an impartial arbiter who considers the
partisan presentation of the evidence offered by each side and is able,
after weighing the arguments offered, to discern what is truth and
what is sophistry. From this discernment of truth comes a judgment as
to the rights of the parties. This is the consequentialist claim upon
which the defense of zealous advocacy hinges: that it is only through
this clash of adversaries that these ends can be achieved. The role of
the lawyer is thus to be both neutral-not to judge the aims or
interests of the clients ex ante, but merely to present them in their
unmediated

state-and

partisan-to

present those

unmediated

interests as persuasively as possible to the tribunal, in order to let the
2
judge or jury decide what is true, and what is therefore due to whom. '
There is thus, on the standard conception, a mutual
interdependence between the amorality and ethicality of the lawyer's
role. That is, it is only because lawyers in their capacity as neutral
partisans are believed to play such a crucial role in the achievement of
society's highest ends that they are exempt from being judged
negatively on the basis of individual acts taken on behalf of clients.
the standard view of the lawyer's role, which are frequently put in these terms.
19. These, at least, are the values thought to be realized by the adversary system
in the civil context. There are a host of additional values attributed to the adversary

system in the criminal context, but because I view the criminal context as a special
case, I leave these aside for purposes of the present discussion. For further discussion
of zealous advocacy in the criminal context, see infra note 59.

20. Consequentialism is the moral theory which holds that "the rightness or
wrongness of an action always depends on the consequences of the action, on its
tendency to lead to intrinsically good or bad states of affairs." Bernard Williams,
Morality: An Introduction to Ethics 82-83 (2d ed. 1993).
21. This is the argument behind the claim of the American College of Trial
Lawyers that "the most effective way to discover truth and preserve rights is through
an adversarial process in which attorneys have 'undivided fidelity to each client's
interests as the client perceives them."' Rhode, supra note 2, at 15. Rhode describes
the passage from which this quote is taken as "aptly" summarizing the conventional
view. Id.
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Indeed, lawyers who undertake the role of neutral partisan to further
their clients' interests, reserving judgment even when they themselves
find their clients' interests to be problematic or even reprehensible,
are on this view not to be condemned for their amorality but rather
celebrated as the agents that make possible the achievement of
society's highest values. This assessment of the highly ethical
character of the lawyer's role extends even to those actions that might
seem, to the uninitiated at least, to be morally indefensible under any
circumstances, such as a lawyer protecting a client's confidences even
where the information, if disclosed, could save the lives of innocent
third parties.'
Again, the justification for such an action is the
consequentialist one we have seen to be grounded in the needs of the
adversary system, in this case the need for a relationship of candor
and trust between lawyer and client. Without an expectation of
confidentiality, it is argued, clients would not trust their lawyers
sufficiently to disclose all the details bearing on the case, thus
compromising the lawyer's ability to be an effective advocate for the
client.13
In sum, by occupying the role of zealous advocate assigned to them
by the adversary system, lawyers are claimed to be serving the needs
and interests of the justice system and thus performing a vital service
for society as a whole. Although in particular cases-when, for
example, defending a multinational corporation with deep pockets
22. The classic case of such a circumstance is Spaulding v. Zimnmerman, 116 N.W.
2d 704 (Minn. 1962). In that case, the defendants' lawyers knew the plaintiff,
Spaulding, to have an aneurysm, a life-threatening condition of which Spaulding
himself was unaware and which could mean instant death unless treated with simple
surgery. Id. at 707. The lawyers concluded that their duty of confidentiality to their
clients required that they keep the fact of the aneurysm confidential, and they did so,
a move that only came to light when, two years later, Spaulding had an army physical
that disclosed his condition. Id. at 708. Spaulding then petitioned to have the original
settlement vacated, and although the court granted his motion, it took great pains in
so doing to emphasize that "no canon of ethics or legal obligation" required the
lawyers to inform Spaulding or his counsel about the aneurysm. Id. at 710. These
words remain true to this day, although the ABA House of Delegates recently
approved modifications to its confidentiality rule in a way that would allow lawyers in
their discretion to disclose confidences "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." Model
Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(1) (approved amended draft 2001).
23. In the criminal context, this argument takes on a constitutional cast, the idea
being that, if a defendant's right to adequate assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment is to be meaningful, a lawyer must know all she can about the case and
especially all the client knows about the case. The client must therefore be able to
trust the lawyer not to reveal his confidences to the prosecution. Or, as criminal
defense lawyer Frank Armani colloquially put it: "The question of the Constitution,
the question of even a bastard like him having a proper defense, having adequate
representation, being able to trust his lawyer as to what he says." Frank Armani,
Ethics on Trial, WETA-TV video 1987, quoted in Rhode & Luban. supra note 1, at
185 (addressing the question as to why he had notoriously refused to reveal where his
client, accused serial killer Robert Garrow, buried the bodies of his victims, despite
impassioned pleas from the families of the victims for news of their loved ones).
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against a child maimed or paralyzed by a faulty product manufactured
by his client-a lawyer's actions may seem morally dubious,
proponents of this view would argue that this impression is based on a
misunderstanding of the lawyer's necessary role in the system as a
whole.
At first, there is much that seems compelling about this set of
justifications for the zealous advocacy role. However, leaving aside
the criminal justice context-the context in which, for many
commentators, the justification for the zealous advocacy model seems
particularly compelling 4 -closer scrutiny of these claims suggests
strong reasons for skepticism, in two key (and in my view definitive)
respects. First, as Rhode among others has argued persuasively, there
is strong reason to doubt that the American-style adversary system as
currently constituted effectively serves the ends of discovering truth
and preserving legal rights in the ways its champions claim.,, Second,
and particularly significant for our purposes, it is by no means obvious
that the values the adversary system is claimed to serve are the most
important among those at stake in any legal contest. Take, for
example, the value of autonomy. Even if it is the case that a lawyer's
unquestioned zealous advocacy promotes the autonomy of the client,
24. See infra note 59.
25. As to truth, this claim in the context of the adversary system presupposes that
extreme partisanship, with its self-interested (and often selective) presentation of the
facts, is as likely to yield an accurate picture as disinterested presentation by, say, an
impartial investigating magistrate. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 55; see also Luban,
supra note 5, at 72. Yet not only is this empirical claim "not self-evident," Rhode,
supra note 2, at 56, but it is also counter-intuitive, particularly given the procedural
mechanisms available to any savvy trial lawyer for the exclusion of relevant evidence.
Luban, supra note 5, at 69 ("Perhaps science proceeds by advancing conjectures and
then trying to refute them; but it does not proceed by advancing conjectures that the
scientist knows to be false and then using procedural rules to exclude probative
evidence."). And in any case, as Rhode points out, "[m]any disputes never reach the
point of formal legal complaint, and of those that do, over ninety percent settle before
trial." Rhode, supra note 2, at 55. As a consequence, the majority of claims are not
actually adjudicated in the adversarial context, and those that are "seldom resemble
the bar's idealized model of adversarial processes" which assumes "roughly equal
incentives, resources, capabilities, and access to relevant information." Id. The
skepticism suggested by these arguments as to the effectiveness of the adversary
system in getting at the truth applies also to the question of legal rights: the ability of
clever advocates in our system to manipulate the rules to achieve victory regardless of
the merits of the case gives reason to doubt not only that the truth has been discerned
but also that the legal rights of the parties have been vindicated. One may, of course,
take the formalist view that no legal rights exist until recognized by a court of law, but
this simply begs the question-on this theory we could equally celebrate the
preservation of rights whatever legal system we had. And anyway, the fact that,
under the current system, parties with valid legal claims are frequently outmatched by
adversaries with more resources and thus greater access to more zealous advocacy on
their behalf creates reason to doubt that the results of the adversary system as
currently constituted are an adequate reflection of the parties' relative rights under
the law. For more comprehensive discussions on these points, see Luban, supra note
5, at 68-78; Rhode, supra note 2, at 55-57.
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in the sense of promoting individuals' initiative and responsibility for
their own ends, the autonomy of the client is not, as Rhode and David
Luban have argued, "the only value" of social importance.' In fact,
depending on the context, this value may be of lesser importance than
other values.'7 For this reason, one who wants to defend the role of
zealous advocate on this ground bears the burden of showing that in a
particular case it is client autonomy with which we should be most
concerned.' And this goes not merely for client autonomy, but for all
the values the lawyer's role as zealous advocate allegedly serves. For
in the course of zealously representing their clients, lawyers may be
called upon to act in ways that considerably compromise the health,
safety, or financial well-being of innocent third parties, harm the
environment, undermine public institutions including our regulatory
system, and/or weaken public trust in the fairness and integrity of both
the legal system and its guardians.29 The client's goals may well be
legal, and the lawyer's advocacy for those aims may be consistent with
his or her duty of loyalty to the client, but as Rhode emphasizes, this is
not the same as saying that advocacy that risks unjust results is
consistent with, much less designed to realize, society's most pressing
interests and values? ° Because there are important social values
cherished by the public other than those claimed to be promoted by
the adversary system, proponents of the standard account cannot
simply assume ex ante that this latter set of values represents society's
only priorities and thus that their vision of the lawyer's role is justified
26. See Rhode & Luban, supra note 1, at 152.
27. As might be said, for example, if a client sought to exercise his autonomy to
develop a piece of land under his control when doing so might endanger a fragile
ecosystem.
28. I use the term "we" here deliberately, to emphasize that the lawyer who
adopts the role of the zealous advocate escapes moral judgment for her professional
acts only at the behest of society. The role, in other words, is one that society affirms
as morally legitimate precisely in order to promote the public values that are
considered necessary and desirable in a free and just society.
29. For example, in the name of preserving client confidences-a central
component of loyalty to the client-lawyers have been called on to: conceal from the
court that the client, a convicted rapist, has through a clerical error escaped
sentencing and remains at large in the community; keep secret the fact that the
opposing party has a life threatening condition of which he remains unaware because
of an oversight by his own inexperienced counsel; conceal from a former client's new
counsel the fact of that client's fraud to the tune of almost $60 million, causing new
counsel to assist in negotiating almost $15 million in new fraudulent loans; and keep
confidential the fact that an employer intends to sell as safe a shipment of defective
dialysis machines that will potentially put patients at risk. See Rhode, supra note 2, at
106-08 (citing Tom Coakley, N.M. Rapists Free 10 Years in Court Foul-Up, Denver
Post, Mar. 23, 1983, at 12A; Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W. 2d 704 (Minn. 1962);
OPM Leasing Services, Inc., in The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers 184 (Phillip B.
Heymann and Lance Liebman eds. 1988); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E. 2d 104 (111.
1991)). Such actions may well be consistent with a lawyer's obligation of loyalty to
the client, but that is not the same as saying they are consistent with society's most
pressing interests and values. See itd. at 106-07.
30. Id.
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in all cases. Instead, this claim must be argued for-and may not
always be persuasive.3 1
To some, this last suggestion may seem to miss the point. For the
way it has commonly been conceived, the zealous advocate is not a
role available for a lawyer to freely choose or discard at will
depending on the circumstances of the case, but is rather a model for
lawyering in all cases, regardless of the particulars. Indeed, it might
be thought, were lawyers to decide sua sponte whether to conform to
the system's demands for neutrality based on the worth of the client's
interests and for partisanship on behalf of those interests, the system's
mechanisms would be subverted and it would cease to function. Yet if
the critique of the standard view offered above has any force, it
suggests that society's interests are not actually served by an acrossthe-board ex ante commitment by lawyers to adopting the neutral
partisan role. Indeed, such a commitment may well undermine
societal interests. And if this is so, the presumption in favor of the
standard view of lawyering for reasons of promoting such interests
cannot be sustained in all cases.
The foregoing discussion suggests a puzzle: If society's interests are
not ultimately served by the standard view of the lawyer's role, why
does it persist? As Rhode has convincingly shown, there is at least
one group that stands to benefit a great deal from the broad
acceptance of this view: lawyers themselves. 32 Adopting this view
provides lawyers, constructed thereby as "amoral technicians," with a
highly simplified moral universe which offers easy guideposts for
action that allow lawyers to sidestep wrenching ethical dilemmas, and
with the luxury of acting on behalf of clients free from the risk of
moral censure. 33 It secures for members of the profession the status
and satisfaction that comes with occupying a role that is viewed as
serving society's highest ends.
And, as Rhode demonstrates
throughout her book, it provides considerable professional advantage
for lawyers, who are able to market their services effectively by
pledging to prospective clients their undivided loyalty and zeal. If,
however, Rhode is right and the public interest is routinely
undermined by lawyers' "reflexive retreat into role,"' those of us
31. To take this position, it bears noting, is not the same as saying that it is never
socially desirable or appropriate for lawyers to adopt the role of zealous advocate. As
we will see below in our discussion of Rhode's alternative account, see infra Part I.B
and accompanying text, there will be contexts and circumstances in which furtherance
of public values of the highest order will require neutral partisanship on the part of
lawyers.
32. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 58.
33. As Wasserstrom nicely puts it: "For most lawyers, most of the time, pursuing
the interests of one's clients is an attractive and satisfying way to live in part just
because the moral world of the lawyer is a simpler, less complicated, and less
ambiguous world than the moral world of ordinary life." Wasserstrom, supra note 14,
at 9.
34. Rhode, supra note 2, at 52.
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seeking the basis of ethical lawyering must look elsewhere for a
satisfying account of lawyers' professional obligations.
B. Rhode's Contextual Alternative
For Rhode, the most troubling aspect of the standard view is that it
exempts lawyers from the obligation to reflect critically on the
question of what justice requires. As she sees it, justice is not the
inevitable byproduct of zealous advocacy, but requires for its
achievement deliberate efforts in that direction. As she puts it, if
lawyers want to claim for themselves the status of "officers of justice,
they must accept greater obligations to pursue justice."35 It is this
demand that lawyers view the obligation to pursue justice as a central
aspect of their professional responsibility that forms the basis of
Rhode's alternative to the standard conception of the lawyer's role.
But what exactly does Rhode mean by the pursuit of justice?
Reading her work, the picture that emerges is one of justice as the
achievement of a morally defensible balance of the competing
interests at stake in any legal struggle. 6 If lawyers are to do justice
they must be ready to take account in any given case of all the
interests at stake37-including the interests of third parties and not
merely the interests of the client and the lawyers themselves. As such,
before acting on behalf of a client, they must consider all the
consequences of the actions they contemplate
for all of these
39
interests,.' not just legally but morally as well.

35. Id. at 17.
36. Actually, reading the whole of In the Interests of Justice reveals that, for
Rhode, justice has a dual aspect. In addition to the conception of justice I describe
here, Rhode also views justice in a more basic way as a straightforward product of the

legal system, at least in its ideal form. Rhode's well-known concern with the question
of how to ensure broad and equitable access to legal services and to the legal system

itself for all members of society stems from this second, more basic understanding of
justice. As she sees it, if the possibility of justice in a rule-of-law society such as ours
requires access to the legal system and legal representation to make that access

meaningful, fairness requires that these goods must be made available to all citizens.
See id. at 117-41; Deborah Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Md. L
Rev. 274 (1986); Deborah Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much
Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 989 (1998).

37. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 67.
38. This insistence that lawyers must consider the consequences of actions taken
on behalf of clients distinguishes Rhode's view significantly from the standard
account, which judges lawyers' adversarial advocacy independently of the
consequences that advocacy is likely to generate. As Simon has put it, there is a

notion underpinning the standard account of the lawyer's role that "there is an
inherent value or legitimacy to the judicial proceeding (and to a more qualified

extent, the entire legal system) which makes it possible for a lawyer to justify specific
actions without reference to the consequences they are likely to promote." Simon,
supra note 1, at 90.
39. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 79.
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Even this brief account allows us to identify key features of Rhode's
alternative model of the lawyer's role. First, her approach is highly
contextual. That is, Rhode rejects the notion that lawyers should
automatically approach every context as a zealous advocate. As she
sees it, it is precisely because situations change and contexts vary that
it is not possible for lawyers to make a once-and-for-all judgment as to
whether their obligation is simply to defend zealously the client's
interests. Instead, a lawyer must in each case consider the full range
of interests likely to be affected by his advocacy, and make a
determination as to what approach to the client's interests justice
requires the lawyer to take in the particular context.4" Second, the
model she offers is anti-legalistic. Rhode rejects the assumption of the
standard view that lawyers need only concern themselves with the
requirements of the law. For Rhode, it is precisely because lawyers
are well-positioned to understand the competing interests at stake in
any legal conflict that they are obliged to attend to the moral
consequences of their professional actions.41 And, finally, as these
other features suggest, unlike the standard account, on which a lawyer
"knows but one person in all the world ...his client,"4 2 Rhode insists

that lawyers in the course of their professional actions must recognize
and consider all the interests that stand to be affected by those
actions.
Rhode recognizes that reasonable people may disagree in any given
instance about the meaning and requirements of justice, and thus that
"[i]ndividual lawyers may have good faith disagreements about how
[particular] conflicts should be resolved."43 In her view, "in a
profession as large and diverse as the American bar," it is to be
40. See id. at 67. Arguably, the term "contextual" could also be used to describe
the zealous advocacy model, in the sense that the particular actions a zealous
advocate takes in zealously advocating for the interests of their clients will vary

depending on the circumstances.

On Rhode's view, in contrast, what varies by

context is the determination whether the lawyer should take on the role of zealous
advocate and prioritize the interests of the client in this particular instance at the

expense of all the other interests at stake. Perhaps a better term to capture this
feature of Rhode's view is "particularist," but I stick with the term "contextualist"

notwithstanding the possibility of confusion on this score, because this is the term that
is commonly used to express this idea by others writing in this area. See, e.g., Simon,
supra note 5, at 9 (referring to his preferred approach to ethical decisionmaking by

lawyers, "in which decisions often turn on 'the underlying merits'," as "the Contextual

View").
41. In this respect, Rhode's model is like Simon's-although, as we will see below,
Simon takes the implications of this anti-legalistic perspective farther than Rhode is
comfortable doing. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
42. See Rhode & Luban, supra note 1, at 186 (quoting Lord Brougham).
43. As Rhode puts it, "any framework that builds on general principles while

remaining sensitive to social context will leave room for argument about appropriate

results." Rhode, supra note 2, at 71. Rhode does, of course, rule out one particular
conception of justice: the rule-utilitarian position that justice is maximized overall
when lawyers act in all cases according to the zealous advocacy model of ethical
lawyering.
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expected that "different lawyers will make different judgments about
what is in fact just."' The point is not that all lawyers reason the same
way, but rather that all are obliged as moral agents to make a good
faith effort in any situation to determine what ought to happen.
Rhode is not trying to achieve a consensus on the substantive meaning
of justice. She is rather making the more modest claim that even in
light of our disagreements about justice it is better if lawyers act in
good faith, reflect in a given case on the various interests involved and
what is at stake for each, and, applying their own moral principles,
reach a judgment as to the most morally defensible course under the
circumstances. The idea is thus not uniform substantive outcomes,
4
but moral reflection and deliberative action by responsible agents.
Although Rhode focuses more on urging lawyers to be true to what
they perceive is right, rather than suggesting a full substantive account
of what is right, she nevertheless does argue that there are certain
values to which all lawyers must be assumed to be committed. For
example, simply by virtue of their status as moral agents, lawyers are
obliged to do what they can to protect innocent third parties from
harm. In addition, by virtue of their professional status, Rhode
ascribes to lawyers the responsibility of acting in ways that support
and reinforce, rather than undermine, the institutions that comprise
the legal system. 46 Thus, in addition to their obligation to "prevent
unnecessary harm to third parties," lawyers are also obliged to show
respect for the rule of law, 47 and to act in ways that "promote a just
and effective legal system, and to respect core values such as honesty,
fairness, and good faith on which that system depends.-,"
That Rhode thus presumes on the part of all lawyers a commitment
to these specific values may at first appear inconsistent with her
recognition that individual lawyers will have different views about
what justice requires. If her view permits lawyers to implement their
own perceived views about justice, must she not also allow the
possibility that some individual lawyers will subscribe to moral views
44. Rhode, supra note 2, at 79.
45. See Id. at 71 ("The advantage of the contextual framework proposed here is
not that it promises bright-line answers but, rather, that it promotes ethically
reflective analysis and commitments.").
46. This position has been eloquently defended by Bob Gordon. As he puts it,
Think of lawyers as having the job of taking care of a tank of fish. The fish
are their clients, in this metaphor. As lawyers, we have to feed the fish. But
the fish, as they feed, also pollute the tank. It is not enough to feed the fish.
We also have to help change the water.
Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired Guns, in Ethics in Practice:
Lawyers' Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation 42, 54 (Deborah L Rhode ed., 2000)
[hereinafter Ethics in Practice].
47. "In accommodating [their] responsibilities, lawyers should, of course, be
guided by relevant legal authority and bar regulatory codes. Respect for law is a
fundamental value, particularly among those sworn to uphold it." Id. at 67.
48. Id.
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that reject the centrality of those values Rhode ascribes by definition
to all lawyers? There is, however, a limit to Rhode's endorsement of
diverse moral views, one that resolves this apparent inconsistency.
While she recognizes the possibility of differing moral views, she
nonetheless maintains that a lawyer's conduct in the course of seeking
justice must accord with principles consistent with a commitment to
the maintenance of a legal system and capable of being
universalized. 49
Although Rhode says little to elaborate this
approach, it appears to borrow something from the Kantian notion of
the categorical imperative, the celebrated injunction which holds that
one should "[a]ct always according to that maxim whose universality
as a law you can at the same time will." 50 The idea behind this
imperative, simply put, is that it is unjustifiable to act in any way such
that, if your act were "universalized" into a principle of conduct, it
could not logically provide a guide to conduct for all moral actors.
The classic example is that of telling a lie: If everyone told lies, then
eventually no one would believe anything anyone said, and it would
no longer be possible to "lie" in the sense of telling an untruth that
passes for truth.
At least something of this notion of universalizability seems to
explain Rhode's insistence that a lawyer is obliged in the course of her
professional actions to promote the values necessary to preserve the
integrity of the legal system For, as Rhode's discussion implies, as
with our example of telling lies, if everyone who operated within the
institutional framework of the law acted to undermine the system's
core values, there would be no more institutional framework, no more
legal system as we know it, and no further context in which lawyers
could continue to vindicate the legal rights of their clients. Because
"act so as to undermine the values on which the legal system depends
for its continuing legitimacy" is not a principle that can be coherently
universalized among members of the legal profession, actions taken in
accord with its dictates will by definition be inconsistent with any
reasonable interpretation of what justice requires.
Rhode also prescribes to lawyers an obligation to do what they can
in their professional capacity to protect innocent third parties from
harm, and this obligation too seems to follow from her insistence that
the principles of ethical lawyers be universalizable. For lawyers in the
course of their professional lives routinely work to protect their clients
from unnecessary and unjustified harm, and in so doing demand that
the system treat their clients justly and that all parties involved act
toward them and their clients with honesty, fairness, and good faith.
If these are demands that lawyers routinely make of the system and
the players within it, ethical lawyers must reciprocate in these regards
49. Id. ("Lawyers' conduct should be justifiable under consistent, disinterested,
and generalizable principles.").
50. See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals *437.
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in the actions they take toward other affected parties as wen as to the
system itself. To satisfy this universalizability requirement, it cannot
be enough that all lawyers "universally" make a commitment merely
to help their own clients. For, as Rhode's discussion makes clear,
lawyers are not just professionals but also human beings. And
because, like all human beings, lawyers are vulnerable to harm at the
hands of others and thus dependent on the respect and fair-dealing of
others to protect them from harm, it is not open to them to act, even
in their professional capacity, in ways that cause harm to innocent
others.
What would the adoption of Rhode's ethic mean for lawyers in
practice? For one thing, Rhode takes for granted that a lawyer is
entitled to be selective in his choice of clients, refusing representation
to those whose goals and interests are at odds with the lawyer's
personal moral commitments. This approach might well raise
legitimate concerns were it to be universally accepted and thus create
the possibility that some persons-say, those with politically
unpopular views-would be unable to find representation. Yet even if
approach were widely adopted, it seems to me reasonable to expect
that there would be a sufficient number of lawyers committed to the
principle of universal access to justice that the client in question would
be able to secure representation on that basis, notwithstanding the
general unpopularity of her views.
Rhode would further expect, with Luban, 1 that the ethical lawyer
would engage the client in discussions as to the moral implications of
the client's preferred ends. 3 However, if this discussion fails to
persuade the client against ends that, if pursued, would require the
51. See infra 72-73 and accompanying text.
52. A zealous advocate would not, of course, be precluded from having such a
dialogue with clients. But for ethical lawyers on Rhode's or Luban's view, this

dialogue would necessarily encompass, among other considerations, the broader
moral implications of the client's ends. For zealous advocates, on the other hand, the

priority would be on understanding the client's goals in order to achieve them, with
broader moral considerations coming into play only to the extent that the client is

interested in considering them.
53. Such discussion is consistent with the rules governing lawyers' conduct, in
particular Rule 2.1, which states: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation." Model

Rules of ProfI Conduct R. 2.1 (2000); see also R. 2.1 cmt. ("It is proper for a lawyer to
refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice."); Model Code of

Prof'1 Responsibility EC 7-8 (1981) ("In assisting his client to reach a proper decision,
it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a
decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible."). At the same time,
however, the drafters of the Rules seem to assume that the relevance of these moral
considerations for the client's position is only that such considerations may "impinge
upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied."
See R. 2.1 cmt.
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lawyer to act against her own moral sense, on Rhode's view a lawyer
must refuse to assist even a client she has already agreed to represent.
This position need not, Rhode maintains, deny the client the right to

pursue his own interests. To the contrary, in her view, decisions that
affect the achievement of clients' aims "should rest with clients," for
"[t]hey are, after all, the ones who have to live with the result."' Yet
the fact that a client has the right to pursue particular ends does not

mean he has the right to the assistance of a particular lawyer to do so,
even if that lawyer has already been retained.5 For, as we have seen,
on Rhode's conception, lawyers too are moral agents, and they
therefore "have a right and a responsibility to determine whether

their support is ethically justifiable," 56 which includes the
responsibility to refuse assistance
when the lawyer concludes it is
57
morally necessary to do so.
Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, this model need not
necessarily preclude lawyers from playing the role of neutral partisans
on behalf of their clients. For, depending on the circumstances, a
lawyer carefully reflecting on the situation before him may well
conclude, given the moral principles to which he is committed, that
adopting the role of zealous advocate on behalf of his client in this
particular instance is precisely what justice requires. The difference
for Rhode is that zealous advocacy should not be the required stance
of the lawyer in all contexts, but a choice, made by the lawyer on a
case-by-case basis58 after careful reflection on the various interests at
54. Rhode, supra note 2, at 72.
55. This idea has support in the ABA Model Rules. See R. 1.16(b)(3) ("[A] lawyer
may withdraw from representing a client if ...a client insists upon pursuing an
objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent."); R. 1.16(b)(3) ("[A]
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if ...a client insists upon taking
action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement.") (approved amended draft 2001).
56. Rhode, supra note 2, at 72.
57. See id. at 69. As Rhode puts it, "[cilient trust and confidentiality are entitled
to weight, but they must be balanced against other equally important concerns." Id. at
67. In taking this position, Rhode is unmoved by the familiar rejoinder that the client
will simply replace lawyers who refuse with "a less 'high minded' successor, who will
insulate the client from future conscientious advice." Id. at 69 (quoting Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law 145 (1978)). As she puts it, it is "by no
means clear how often a moral stand by lawyers will force them to resign and make
way for someone worse." Id. at 69. Indeed, it is her hope that lawyers who question
the moral legitimacy of clients' ends will "raise the stakes for [those] clients, both
psychologically and economically," thus "prompt[ing] clients to rethink their
objectives rather than replac[ing] their attorney." Id.
58. On the standard view, if lawyers are perceived to have choices at all, it is the
choice of whether to accept the representation of a particular client who seeks their
services. This choice, is, to be sure, acknowledged as a moral one, one for which, as
Monroe Freedman has maintained, "the lawyer can properly be held morally
accountable." See Monroe Freedman, The Morality of Lawyering, Legal Times, Sept.
20, 1993. at 22, quoted in Rhode & Luban, supra note 1, at 134, 135. But from this
perspective, the possibility of moral judgment evaporates as soon as the
representation has been accepted, after which the lawyer is believed to have "a duty,
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stake in the specific context59 and for which the lawyer should be held

morally accountable.
The foregoing discussion may lead some readers to conclude that
Rhode is more concerned with protecting the lawyer's soul than
achieving justice. For while proponents of zealous advocacy recognize
that vindicating society's highest values may require lawyers to do
things on behalf of their clients that they would otherwise find morally
troubling, Rhode seems unwilling to have lawyers do what they

believe is morally distasteful, even, it may seem to defenders of the
standard view, at the expense of justice. As we have seen, however,
Rhode doubts the claim that society's interests are best served by an
absolute ex ante commitment on the part of lawyers to the role of

neutral partisan. Certainly, Rhode's model creates space for a lawyer
to follow her conscience and refuse to assist a client, rather than
undertaking actions or achieving ends which she cannot morally
condone. This is part of its attraction for those who fear that
uncritical adoption of the neutral partisanship model will take a toll
on lawyers who are, after all, human beings and moral agents as well
as professionals. But my sense is that, for Rhode, this appealing
feature is secondary to the central belief that a profession whose
to the best of his ability to advocate a position, if his client's interest so requires,
which counsel may personally regard as contrary to the public interest." Abe Krash,
ProfessionalResponsibility to Clients and the Public Interest: Is There a Conflict?, 55
Chi. B. Rec. 36 (special centennial supplement 1974). For Rhode, however, lawyers
have both moral agency and the capacity for moral reflection, qualities that do not
disappear the moment the representation begins. Furthermore, from the perspective
of one who, like Rhode, seeks to hold lawyers morally responsible for their choices
and actions, views like Freedman's arbitrarily privilege the moment of initial
consultation. What if a client is not honest at the outset about her goals? What if she
changes her mind later on? If lawyers should have leeway on moral grounds to refuse
a request for their services, it is not clear why this moral agency should vanish as soon
as the representation begins.
59. Rhode assumes this process of reflection will ordinarily lead to the
endorsement of the zealous advocacy approach by lawyers operating in the criminal
defense context, where the "potential for governmental abuse" and the threat posed
by the system to "individuals' lives, liberty, and reputation" tilt the equities heavily
toward the need for nonjudgmental and zealous advocacy. Rhode, supra note 2, at 72;
see also Luban, supra note 5, at 148 ("In the criminal defense paradigm, the appeal to
the adversary system by-and-large vindicates the kind of partisan zeal characterized in
the standard conception."); Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 12 (endorsing the neutral
partisanship model in the criminal justice context while criticizing its application to
the civil context); id. ("Because a deprivation of liberty is so serious, because the
prosecutorial resources of the state are so vast, and because, perhaps, of a serious
skepticism of the rightness of punishment even where wrongdoing has occurred, it is
easy to accept the view that it makes sense to charge the defense counsel with the job
of making the best possible case for the accused-ithout regard, so to speak, for the
merits."). But see Simon, supra note 5, at 170-94 (rejecting the justifications
traditionally offered by critics of zealous advocacy for a criminal defense exception).
The question, of course, is whether these concerns are dispositive, and for Rhode's
model to be consistent she must leave this final determination to individual lawyers
themselves.
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members assume personal responsibility for serving society's interests
and achieving justice will be more likely overall to do so successfully
than a profession in which these goals are assumed byproducts of
helping clients get what the law allows them.
Leaving it up to an individual to determine the appropriate course
to justice in any given instance does, it is true, create a risk that he will
get it wrong as others see it-or worse, that he is committed to a
moral conception that others would outright condemn. This risk,
however-the risk that the moral agents who use their own moral
judgment will draw conclusions as to what justice requires on the basis
of values that others might well vehemently oppose-is one that any
contextual conception must run. Rhode attempts to contain this risk,
but to the extent that lawyers could act consistently with her
specifications and nonetheless reach results that others might find
morally troubling, Rhode's model would be required on its own terms
to affirm their engagement in ethical lawyering.
C. Rhode's IndividualistEthic
This, then, is what it means on Rhode's account for lawyers to
pursue justice: careful reflection in the particular situation on the
interests at stake and the likely consequences of alternative actions,
with the choice of what do to on behalf of one's client being made on
the basis of a consistent commitment to universalizable values and
principles and the acceptance by lawyers of personal responsibility
"for the moral consequences of their professional actions."' In the
vast majority of cases, of course, lawyers will not be called to account
for their choices before any sort of tribunal, or even before the court
of public opinion. As Rhode well recognizes, the disciplinary system
in place to scrutinize lawyers' actions is woefully inadequate,
incapable of addressing even many of the most egregious cases of
lawyer misconduct.6 Thus if lawyers are to assume personal
responsibility for their professional conduct in the way Rhode
advocates, they must decide to do so, not out of fear of sanction or
public recrimination but on the basis of individual choices as to how to
conduct their professional lives. Rhode's ethic is thus best understood
as an individual ethic, which offers guidance as to the nature of ethical
practice and leaves it up to each lawyer individually to decide whether
to follow it. Whether an individual lawyer has the capacity or
inclination to conform to the demands of this ethic will depend to a
great extent on the nature of his or her own moral character.
In this respect, Rhode's approach is in line with other contextual
models of lawyering. Simon, for example, has argued that lawyers
60. Rhode, supra note 2, at 67.
61. See id. at 158-60. Even among those cases of lawyer misconduct assessed
before a tribunal, it is the rare one that receives any sort of public attention.

2002]

POSSIBILITY OFINTEGRITY

1647

"should take those actions that, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to promote
justice."'62 Fulfilling this obligation, Simon maintains, requires that
lawyers recognize a "professional duty of reflective judgment,"'63 the
exercise of which presumes that lawyers have the qualities of
character that will lead them to take this duty seriously, to reflect
carefully, and to act on their deliberative judgment as to what justice
requires. And Luban, strenuously rejecting what he labels the
"nonaccountability principle" of the standard view-the idea that "a
lawyer is responsible neither for the means used nor the ends achieved
in a legal representation"64-conceives the role of ethical lawyer as
one of "moral activist" who, among other things,I approaches client
representation with the expectation of discussing with clients the
moral implications of their projects and ends.' For Luban, "nothing
permits a lawyer to discard her discretion or relieves her of the
necessity of asking whether a client's project is worthy of a decent
person's service. ' This notion, too, assumes that lawyers will have
the inclination and the capacity to make moral judgments about which
projects are worthy of their efforts and to act on those judgments,
even when doing so is against the client's interests, or their own.
There are certainly differences between these various contextual
accounts. Most notably perhaps, Simon argues that lawyers ought to
apply to the rules governing the lawyer's role the same sort of
"complex, flexible judgment" they routinely bring to the reading of
laws in other contexts,' whereas Rhode seems to accord more
deference to the "formal rules" necessary for "effective legal
processes."69 Rhode also sides with Luban against Simon on the
question of the unique character of the criminal defense context.
Rhode argues that in the criminal context the standard role of the
lawyer as zealous advocate is not only appropriate but necessary to
promote society's interests,70 while Simon sees no reason to
62. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L Rev. 1083,

1090 (1988); see also Simon, supra note 5, at 9.
63. Simon, supra note 62, at 1083; see also Simon, supra note 5, at 10 ("[T]he
essence of this approach is contextual judgment-a judgment that applies relatively
abstract norms to a broad range of the particulars of the case at hand.").
64. Luban, supra note 5, at 160.

65. On Luban's view, moral activism also involves "law reform-explicitly putting
one's phronesis, one's savvy, to work for the common weal." Id. at 173 (emphasis
omitted).
66. See id ("Client counseling, in turn, means discussing with the client the
rightness or wrongness of her projects, and the possible impact of those projects on
'the people."').
67. Id. at 174. Like Rhode, Luban contemplates that there will be times when the
lawyer's moral views are sufficiently at odds with the clients' that representation will
be impossible. See id
68. Simon, supra note 1, at 186.
69. Rhode, supra note 2, at 77.
70. See supra note 59.
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distinguish the criminal defense context from any other context in
which the lawyers' obligation is to exercise discretionary judgment as
to what justice requires under the circumstances.71 Finally, although
she does not address this case directly, Rhode seems more likely than
either Simon or Luban to shrink from the notion that a lawyer who
believes her client to be engaged in a project that is fundamentally
immoral or unjust may legitimately act unbeknownst to that client to
undermine those projects and thus the client's interests. Although
Luban, for example, suggests that if the lawyer's attempts at moral
counseling fail and the client too has failed to convince the lawyer of
the justice of her projects, 7 there will likely be at that point "a parting
of ways," he also contemplates the possibility that at that point there
may be, depending on the circumstances, "a betrayal by the lawyer of
a client's projects, if the lawyer persists in the conviction that they are
immoral or unjust."'73
In the main, however, Luban and Simon share with Rhode the view
that ethical lawyering requires the exercise of discretion by individual
lawyers, who must judge for themselves in any given situation what
justice requires and act accordingly. And, for this reason, the success
of their models depends, as does Rhode's, on the inclination and
capacity of individual lawyers to act in these ways, and thus on the
presence among individual lawyers of the sort of moral character that
would render them thus inclined and capable of so doing.
Zealous advocacy, too, presupposes certain traits of character in the
lawyers who adhere to its particular conception of ethical lawyering.
Yet despite the centrality of individual moral character to the
possibility of ethical lawyering however one conceives it, there has
been, with the exception of Anthony Kronman's important work in
this area,74 surprisingly little attention paid in the legal ethics literature
to the sort of moral character ethical lawyering requires. Despite this
neglect, it seems to me plain that no theory of legal ethics can be
71. See Simon, supra note 5, at 170-94.

72. For Luban, the moral activist lawyer must remain open to the possibility that
dialogue with the client will lead the lawyer to change his views. Yet if Tanina Rostain

is right that forces of professional socialization can lead to a coherence between the
views of lawyer and client on issues relating to the representation even where there is
a divergence of perspective on broader social, political, and economic questions, there

is at least reason to wonder whether such changes on the part of lawyers would come
as a result of dialogue or other more subtle forces. Tanina Rostain, Waking Up from
Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, DiscretionaryJudgment, and The Practice of
Justice, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 955, 962-64 (1999) (discussing the results of Robert Nelson's
study of corporate lawyers in Chicago); id. at 963 ("Under current conditions of
practice, lawyers may become so identified with their clients that they are unable to
tell when considerations of justice dictate a result at odds with their clients'

interests.").
73. Luban, supra note 5, at 174.
74. See Kronman, Lost Lawyer, supra note 3; see also Stephen L. Carter, Integrity
(1996) (exploring the idea of integrity more generally, although with some legal
applications); Kronman, MoralPhilosophy, supra note 3.
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complete without a theory of the character traits of the ethical lawyer.
In what follows, I offer an account of the traits of character on which,
I argue, the success of Rhode's model-as well as Simon's and
Luban's-depends. I focus in this account on the moral quality of
integrity, which I view as the key to the possibility of ethical lawyering
on this model. The portrait of integrity I sketch is necessarily an ideal
type; few lawyers, indeed few people, will in their daily lives fully
realize the ideal. Yet those of us who aspire to be better people-and
better lawyers-would still benefit from an articulated ideal to which
we can aspire, and it is in providing such an ideal that a theory of
moral character makes its greatest contribution.
II. INTEGRITY
In this part, I support my contention that Rhode's model of ethical
lawyering presupposes, and thus depends for its success upon, the
presence among individual lawyers of the character traits that are
together thought to comprise integrity. To make this case, it is
necessary to have at our disposal a more precise understanding of this
set of traits. For this reason, in what follows, I draw on the work of
moral philosophers of integrity to offer a brief account of the meaning
of this concept. I suggest that a person of integrity has four primary
character traits: a steadfast commitment to her values and principles,
maintained even in the face of negative consequences; deliberative
flexibility; a clear sense of her values and principles; and consistency,
both in the application of her principles and between word and deed.
In addition, I identify four other traits that are arguably associated
with the person of integrity: moral trustworthiness, moral maturity,
clear self-knowledge, and the concomitant of self-knowledge, an
absence of self-deception. Once this account has been sketched, we
will be in a position to recognize that integrity among legal
practitioners is central to the possibility of ethical lawyering the way
Rhode conceives it-and thus that promoting ethical lawyering on
Rhode's framework depends in turn on the possibility of fostering
lawyers' integrity.
It bears emphasizing that, in focusing on the implications of
integrity for Rhode's contextual account, I do not mean to suggest
that moral character is irrelevant to the possibility of ethical lawyering
on the zealous advocacy model, nor that practicing zealous advocates
may lack integrity and still be expected to fulfill their ethical
obligations as that model conceives them. To the contrary, as I
indicate at various points below, at least some of the qualities I discuss
herein are also necessary to the possibility of ethical lawyering on the
zealous advocacy model. The ensuing discussion of the virtues of
ethical lawyering should therefore be of interest even to those readers
who reject the contextual model in favor of the standard view.
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A. Integrity
As Lynne McFall has noted, a person of integrity is "'undivided; an
integrated whole."' 75 The person of integrity is thus in some sense
"the person who keeps his self intact. 7 6 But what is it to keep oneself
intact? At a minimum, the person of integrity manifests the trait of
consistency or steadfastness.' She is "true to [her] commitments,"78
even "in the face of personal or social pressure to do otherwise."7 9
Maintaining one's commitments is thus the first key trait of the person
of integrity. It is easy to act consistently with one's values and
principles when everyone else holds the same commitments and is
encouraging and supportive of them. The real test of steadfastness
comes when, by the act of sticking to one's sense of what is right, one
courts "contempt, ostracism, loss of a job, penal sanctions, the
breakdown of friendships and familial relations, [or] being labeled
'confrontational,' 'difficult,' 'overly sensitive,' or 'militant."' 8
Consistency in this sense is not, however, exclusive to the person of
integrity.
Fanatics, too, will act according to strongly held
commitments and values despite the risk of social opprobrium or
other personal costs. And although fanatics are unrelentingly loyal to
their cause and are willing to pay the price of their loyalty when it
comes with a cost, this is not the same as saying that they have
integrity.
How, then, to distinguish the fanatic from the person of integrity?8
What makes a person a fanatic is the absence of critical distance from
her commitments: A fanatic cleaves to her views and principles no
matter what. No evidence, no argument, however powerfully it may
refute the central tenets of her belief, will dissuade the fanatic from
her commitments or lead her to rethink them.82 The quality of
75. Lynne McFall, Integrity, 98 Ethics 5, 7 (1987) (quoting the Oxford English

Dictionary).
76. Gabriele Taylor, Integrity, 55 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y 143,148 (Supp. 1981).
77. See Daniel Putman, Integrity and Moral Development, 30 J. Value Inquiry 237,
242 (1996) ("Remaining steadfast to deeply held principles is central to what

[integrity] is all about.").
78. Nancy Schauber, Integrity, Commitment and the Concept of a Person, 33 Am.

Phil. Q. 119, 120 (1996).
79. McFall, supra note 75, at 9 ("A person of integrity is willing to bear the
consequences of her convictions. ... "); Jody L. Graham, Does Integrity Require
Moral Goodness?, 14 Ratio 234, 234 (2001); see also Putman, supra note 77, at 237

("Having integrity entails acting consistently on principles despite the presence of
circumstances which might threaten those principles.").
80. Chesire Calhoun, Standingfor Something, 92 J. Phil. 235, 259 (1995).

81. See Graham, supra note 79, at 242-44 for a discussion on the distinction
between "the man who dogmatically stands for a cause and the man of integrity."
82. See id. at 244 ("Someone who is simply unwilling to expose his views to
criticism is vulnerable to serious self-deception or can rightly be accused of a narrowmindedness, stubbornness or fanaticism."); see also Mark S. Halfon, Integrity: A
Philosophical

Inquiry

32-34

(1989)

(offering

the

example

of

a

religious

fundamentalist, whose claim of intellectual integrity would be compromised by an
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integrity, in contrast, implies the capacity for and willingness to
engage in critical reflection on one's values and principles, a process
that involves at a minimum the careful consideration of alternative
viewpoints, a logical assessment of relevant evidence, and an openness
to the possibility that one could, in the face of sufficiently persuasive
arguments, be convinced to rethink one's preferred approach.p The
engagement in this deliberative process distinguishes the person of
integrity not only from the fanatic but also from the person who is
merely predictable. We expect the predictable person to act in a
particular way, but we do not necessarily credit that person with
critical reflection on the path she takes.' The person of integrity, in
contrast, is assumed to have chosen his course after due reflection on
the situation at hand. We may disagree with his choices, but we have
confidence that he does not choose thoughtlessly. Indeed, it is our
faith in his "deliberative flexibility,' ' a capacity the fanatic lacks, that
leads us to respect the choices of a person of integrity, and to credit
those choices as the product of this trait.
A person of integrity is thus one who is willing "to expose [her]
views to criticism" and "to reassess and revise [her] principles" in fight
of persuasive arguments and evidence. 6 This deliberative flexibility, a
second key trait of the person of integrity, does not, however, imply
inconstancy. To the contrary, when after due deliberation she
remains convinced of her perspective, the person of integrity will stick
to her guns-notwithstanding, as we have seen, the personal costs of
so doing.' From this it follows that a person of integrity has a clear
set of values and principles to which she self-consciously subscribes,
and in support of which, for what she "takes to be the right reasons,"'
she is steadfast.19
unwillingness to reassess his beliefs in light of evidence that challenged -the truth of
[his] religious beliefs"). The key here is the fanatic's unwillingness to expose her views

to critical reflection or to revise them even in the face of evidence demonstrating the
falsity of her beliefs. Certainly these categories at some point shade into one another,

so that a person of integrity who arrived at his principled commitments through
reasoned deliberation may eventually become fanatical about their promotion and no
longer open to considering alternative perspectives. Whether such a person may
continue to merit the status of a person of integrity because his views were initially
arrived at through a carefully deliberative process is a question I leave to one side for
purposes of this paper.
83. See Halfon, supra note 82, at 133,336; Graham, supra note 79, at 242. Graham
labels this process the assumption of "epistemic responsibility." See id.
84. See Schauber, supra note 78, at 124 (suggesting that a person may be
predictable "through no conscious effort of her own").
85. This quality of deliberative flexibility is the closest analogue of the various
traits of integrity I discuss here to the virtue of "practical wisdom" endorsed by
Kronman as the key to his conception of ethical lawyering. See Kronman, Lost
Lawyer, supra note 3, at 14-17, 41-43, passim (1993).
86. Graham, supra note 79, at 244.
87. See id.
88. McFall, supra note 75, at 9.

89. See Putman, supra note 77, at 242 ("Remaining steadfast to deeply held
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The possession of a clear sense of values, along with a commitment
to their enactment, is the third key trait of the person of integrity.
This feature, though, has led philosophers of integrity to wonder
whether there are any principled limits, internal to the quality itself,
on the substance of the values and principles to which persons of
integrity are committed 0 Put another way, can consistently evil
people have integrity? 91 Considering the question, philosopher Mark
Halfon finds "no a priorirestrictions concerning the object or content
of the commitments of those who have integrity."'
Although he
identifies several criteria for the ascription of integrity, including "a
commitment to investigate the truth of one's beliefs and the intention
to pursue a course of action that one believes is morally right,"'93
Halfon nonetheless finds it conceivable that a Nazi, even qua Nazi,
could have integrity. 94 For although he concedes that "[n]early all
Nazis will be guilty of inconsistency, a failure to acknowledge relevant
empirical evidence, or a refusal to take seriously relevant moral
considerations," we could nonetheless, Halfon argues, "imagine a
nalve and impressionable young Nazi or perhaps a sophisticated and
inquisitive mature Nazi who sincerely believes in the principles of
Nazism and will remain committed to those principles in the face of
adversity."'95
Gabrielle Taylor also concludes, reluctantly, that there is no clear
incompatibility between integrity and all forms of immorality.96 In
principles is central to what the virtue [of integrity] is all about."). But see Schauber,
supra note 78, at 120 ("[Thel core of integrity, some kind of steadfastness, is not by
itself admirable. A steadfast person may be worse than someone more inconstant.").
90. See Schauber, supra note 78, at 120.
91. Both Graham and Putman explore versions of this question. See Graham,
supra note 79, at 234 (asking whether "integrity places some constraint on the nature
of what is stood for"); Putman, supra note 79, at 237 ("Can criminals have
integrity?").
92. Halfon, supra note 82, at 136 (saying of the "virtues of integrity that 'while
necessary, they are not sufficient; for their definition allows for almost any content'
(quoting John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 519 (1971))).
93. Halfon, supra note 82, at 36. From these requirements, Halfon derives further
"restriction[s that] are built into the notion of integrity"-that is, "[plersons of
integrity should consider all relevant and available empirical evidence that apparently
conflicts with the truth of their beliefs. They should also acknowledge and confront
all relevant moral considerations insofar as they intend to do what is right." Id. Other
restrictions logically follow, including "a commitment to conceptual clarity, logical
consistency, and perhaps a moral point of view free from self-deception." Id.
94. Halfon, supra note 82, at 134-36. Halfon distinguishes the question of whether
a Nazi could have integrity, "qua Nazi," from the question of whether such a person
could exhibit integrity in her other roles. Id. at 134. In this latter regard he finds it to
be "relatively obvious that a Nazi could have integrity in the capacity of a friend,
comrade, parent, teacher, and so on." Id. In this sense, he continues, "integrity is like
the virtue of courage. That is, it is a virtue that may be exhibited in some contexts but
not others." Id.
95. Id. at 136.
96. Taylor, supra note 76 at 152 ("[M]y view of integrity fits and explains many of
our intuitions and the major demands we make on the person of integrity.... On the

2002]

POSSIBILITY OFINTEGRITY

1653

particular, she finds that some forms of the deceitful manipulation of
others may be compatible with integrity. 97 Taylor defends this
position that not all deceit indicates an absence of integrity through
the example of Leonora, the heroine of Beethoven's opera Fidelio. 3
After her husband is unjustly imprisoned by political opponents,
Leonora disguises herself as a man and seeks access to the prison to
attempt a rescue. 99 She is befriended by Rocco, the jailor, who hires
her as his assistant, and by his daughter Marzelline, who (of course)
falls in love with the disguised Leonora." Rather than reveal herself
and lose her opportunity to save her husband, who is by now at risk of
execution, Leonora allows herself to be betrothed to Marzelline,'3
thus engaging, as Taylor puts it, "in quite serious deception of people
Although Leonora is plainly false to
who treat her as a friend."'"
Rocco and Marzelline, Taylor maintains that "we should cite her
nonetheless as a case of integrity rather than the lack of it."133 Why is
this so? Because Leonora is acting for "sufficient reason," not only by
We view Leonora as someone who
her own lights, but also by ours.
"get[s] [her] values right,"" 4 who has read the situation, considered
the various options, and rightly decided that saving her husband is
more important than being honest with her new friends.
Taylor's analysis may seem unsatisfying. For how are we to know in
each circumstance whether we-or others-have gotten it right? On
this point, Taylor emphasizes the importance, on the part of the actor,
of self-knowledge, and of the absence of self-deception. One cannot
possibly get one's values right unless one understands clearly one's
own mind and motives. 1 5 Because the self-deceived cannot "get their
in their own minds, they cannot be said to act with
values right"
16
integrity. 0
other hand, I cannot show that ruthless pursuing of one's own ends is incompatible
with integrity. We like to think that the whole or integrated person is also the wholly
good person, but to some extent at least this thought remains an assumption.").
97. Id. at 158.
9& Id. at 152-54. For the full libretto to Beethoven's Fideio, see 2 New Grove
Dictionary of Opera 182, 183-84 (Stanley Sadie ed., 1992).
99. 2 New Grove Dictionary of Opera, supra note 98, at 183.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Taylor, supra note 76, at 152.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 153.
105. See id. at 158 ("As he will be free from confusion [the person of integrity) vill
get his commitments right, and so he will get right his identity in terms of these
commitments. In this sense he can be said to have self-knowledge.").

106. Taylor illustrates this point with reference to a spy, who has betrayed his

country out of what Taylor assumes is a misguided loyalty to friends. See id. at 153.

Her claim is that the spy must be "in a muddle about his values" if he believes that
"loyalty to friends is more important than loyalty to one's country." Id. In making
this claim, Taylor wants to disclaim recourse to an "objective appeal to values," and

instead insists that the relevant consideration is that:

the spy is thought to be so wrong in his assessment of loyalties because he
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But as we have seen, it is not enough to satisfy one's own mind as to
the legitimacy of one's deception: One must also act for reasons that
others would find "sufficient." At the same time, it cannot be that one
may only, consistent with integrity, deceive others for reasons all
would accept as morally laudable or legitimate, for this requirement
would arguably smuggle in the very moral values that Taylor and
Halfon agree are not given content by the concept of integrity itself.
For Taylor, the answer to this puzzle lies in her stipulation -familiar
from our discussion of Rhode-that the values held by a person of
integrity meet what she calls "the demands of consistency," which
require that one act to promote one's values and principles equally
whether it is oneself or another who stands to benefit. 107 Thus, for
example, a person's commitment to the values of "freedom or

scholarship" must be a commitment to the realization of these values
wherever possible and not just in cases that will affect whether she
herself "is free or becomes a scholar," ' for "it is hard to see on what
ground [she] could consistently and without ignoring relevant
does not get his values right in the light of the evidence there is. He is
thought to refuse to reflect and so to be misguided.... If only he had been
prepared to sort things out he would have seen the error of his ways.
Id. at 153. The difficulty here is that the conclusion that the spy has "gotten it wrong"
must stem from something other than reference to the "accuracy" of his ultimate
judgment. More appropriate, it would seem, for an assessment of the integrity of his
action would be an examination of his own values and principles, the circumstances
under which he undertook the assignment, what was at stake, whom he was betraying,
etc. This investigation might well reveal the actions of a man who was very clear on
his own commitments, without any self-deception, and able to justify his actions as
fully consistent with his values in the way Taylor demands. Yet while I am not
entirely convinced by her example of the spy, I nonetheless share Taylor's sense that
self-knowledge and an absence of self-deception are central features of integrity. The
spy example seems to me simply a failure to consistently apply her own standard,
rather than an indication that the standard itself is flawed.
107. Id. at 157 (explaining that the demands of consistency "extend over the
reasons for action generated by [those values themselves)"); see also Halfon, supra
note 82, at 36 (including "logical consistency" among the demands of integrity).
108. Taylor, supra note 76, at 157 ("[T]he demands of consistency extend over the
reasons for action generated by [the actor's] commitments. If he is committed to
freedom or scholarship then this provides him with a reason for bringing freedom or
scholarship about, and not just with a reason for seeing to it that he is free or becomes
a scholar."). Or, to take the example of Leonora, if she is truly acting out of a
consistent commitment to justice, we should expect that she would be equally
committed whether it was her husband or another who was unjustly imprisoned. This
example, however, raises a difficult question for theories that, like Taylor's and also
like Rhode's, demand as proof of integrity a "consistent, disinterested, generalizable"
commitment to particular values. Rhode, supra note 2, at 67. For what does this mean
when an agent is moved to act in defense of her loved ones? Would integrity really
require that Leonora go to such great lengths to rescue the husband of another? Or
to put it another way, if she would not be willing to do so, does this vitiate Taylor's
claim that she acts with integrity? To answer this question is beyond the scope of this
article, but my sense is that this cannot be right, that indeed we tend to think of those
who act with courage for the good of their families as candidates for integrity
notwithstanding that they act in part out of love-assuming, that is, that they do not
privilege the interests of their loved ones to the exclusion of all others.
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evidence deny that what in [her] view is a good for [her] is also a good
for others."'" Evidence that a moral agent-Leonora, for instanceis motivated to act consistently to vindicate her principles, whether or
not she herself stands to benefit, thus goes far to suggest she has
"gotten it right" and acted with integrity, notwithstanding her
deception of others."1
It is thus that Taylor's argument serves to limit the class of the
"morally wicked" who may be found to have integrity by excluding
those who engage in "deceitfully manipulating others" for their own
personal benefit,"' for such people cannot be shown to have acted
according to the demands of consistency as Taylor describes them.
Yet, to her distress, Taylor acknowledges that she has still "not ruled
out the possibility that all the conditions" she has given for a finding
of integrity may be satisfied by others who act in ways "we regard as
morally wrong." ' Indeed, read together, Halfon and Taylor suggest
that, although the concept of integrity imposes constraints that serve
to narrow the range of people with "morally questionable"
characters 13 who may rightly be found to have this quality, possession
of integrity does not by itself imply any particular content for one's
values and ends. This conclusion, though, poses a problem for those
who want to argue, as I do below in my discussion of Rhode's
stipulation that ethical lawyers will defend at least a limited set of
specific values, that people of integrity will, by virtue of this trait,
commit themselves to at least some of the values and ends that we
commonly associate with moral goodness.
The work of Jody Graham may suggest at least a partial solution to
this problem, one that if persuasive poses a significant challenge to the
notion that integrity is content-free. Against the position staked out
by Halfon, Taylor, and others, Graham makes the plausible point that
people of integrity must be "morally trustworthy," a quality that "a
person of morally questionable character" is by definition incapable of
exhibiting. 4 The morally trustworthy, according to Graham, are "in
proper relation to others,"" and have "a genuine regard for the worth

109. Taylor, supra note 76, at 157.
110. It is within this framework that self-knowledge and the absence of selfdeception become markers of integrity: The presence of these character traits make it
possible for the actor to recognize the extent to which her actions are consistent with

her stated values and principles; conversely, their absence allows actors to wrongly

construe self-interested actions as morally defensible.
111. Taylor, supra note 76, at 158.
112- See id. ("I have not ruled out the possibility that all the conditions I have given
may be fulfilled by someone who ruthlessly and without regard for the well-being of

others pursues his own aim, even if in doing so he behaves in ways we regard as
morally wrong. Not every immoral action need be a sign of the agent's corruption.").
113. Graham, supra note 79, at 246.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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of the person. '116 Such a person "respects, first and foremost, the
humanity117in each individual, regardless of the individual's relation to
oneself.

That people of morally questionable character lack the quality of
moral trustworthiness as Graham conceives it seems right. But do
they thereby lack integrity? I believe that they may. Recall Taylor's
notion of "the demands of consistency." ' s The idea here is that in a
given situation a person of integrity acts consistently with his values
and principles, whether it is he himself or some other person who
stands to benefit.119 This requirement, which we can also understand
as the demand that the values and principles of the person of integrity
be universalizable, excludes not only Taylor's deceitful manipulator
but also the egoist. As Daniel Putman explains, although the egoist
may appear to live by a consistent principle-that on every occasion
she ought to act so as to improve her own circumstances-this is not a
principle that is capable of being universalized.1 20 To the contrary, this
so-called principle would "break down" as soon as its proponent is
called upon to "defend [it] on behalf of others." ' In contrast to the
egoist, the morally trustworthy person maintains respect for "the
humanity in each individual regardless of the individual's relation to
oneself."'" Indeed, it is this quality that allows her to recognize and
affirm what consistency requires-and thus to act with integrity.
To say that people of integrity must be morally trustworthy in
Graham's sense, however, is not the same as saying that they
necessarily subscribe to a closed and broad set of specific moral
values. Although for the reasons we have just seen, absence of moral
trustworthiness may suggest a lack of integrity, to some degree Halfon
116. Id. at 247.
117. Id. at 246-47. According to Graham, it is not enough that the person of
integrity must be morally trustworthy. He must also have what she calls "epistemic
trustworthiness." Id. at 244. That is, a person of integrity must make judgments in
which we can have confidence, must have the "experience and moral know-how
concerning when to dig one's heels in" and when to reassess. Id. at 244. It is not
enough that one strives for "open-mindedness, conceptual clarity and logical
consistency.... The person of integrity must [also] be good at these things." Id.
118. See Taylor, supra note 76; see also Halfon, supra note 82, at 36 (referring to
this constraint of integrity as the demand of "logical consistency").
119. This is not to say that people of integrity cannot have deep commitments to
promoting the interests of their loved ones. See supra note 108. But commitment to
certain values and principles may nonetheless require such people at times to act in
ways that fail to promote such interests.
120. See Putman, supra note 77, at 239. Putman offers the example of truthfulness,
arguing that "[p]ersons dedicated to truthfulness have integrity for exactly the reason
that they do not need to control the situation for their own benefit. Dedication to
truthfulness [instead] exists because truthfulness has a value in itself." Id.
121. Id.
122. Graham, supra note 79, at 247 n.23 ("[Moral trustworthiness requires that
one] see individuals as having worth because of an equal standing, not to be lessened
by sacrificing one individual for the good of others.").
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is right: The quality of integrity is consonant with a range-if not an
infinite range-of moral commitments. Why, then, do we tend to
associate people of integrity with unquestionably laudable moral
commitments? The answer, I think, is because those individuals we
view as people of integrity themselves profess such commitments and
demonstrate through their actions that these commitments are real. If
we cannot presume to know in advance the full content of the
commitments of a person of integrity, we can certainly assess in the
moment whether a person's actions match her words. For this reason,
it would seem that consistency between word and deed is also
indicative-if not dispositive-of an actor's integrity.
The above discussion suggests two final character traits of the
person of integrity which bear emphasizing. First, integrity is closely
associated with moral maturity. Putman finds the test of moral
maturity to lie in a person's willingness to put herself and her interests
aside if honoring a professed goal or principle requires that she do
so.123 But in fact each of the traits we have identified-the capacity
for deliberative flexibility, the possession of a clear sense of values
and principles that satisfy the demands of consistency, a commitment
to consistency between word and deed, 24 the willingness to accept the
consequences of doing what one believes is right-presupposes an
agent who is morally mature.1-5
Second, integrity is incompatible with self-deception. We have
already seen that the deception of others is in most cases inconsistent
with integrity; because a person of integrity can only deceive others
for "sufficient reason," that is, on grounds that can be consistently
applied to others as well as oneself,"2 those who deliberately deceive
others for their own benefit by definition lack integrity. But most
people are not willfully deceitful in this way. The more typical case is
a person who wants to see herself, and to have others see her, as a
person who acts in ways that are morally consistent and defensible,
while at the same time promoting her own interests. Such a person, if
aware of the discrepancy between her desire for a praiseworthy image

123. See Putman, supra note 77, at 239. As Putman puts it:

This is a way to test integrity as well as to determine a person's level of
moral maturity. Are people willing to concede that the goal or principle they
are maintaining is justifiable for others as well as self? Are they willing to
put themselves aside if the principle applies more accurately to others? Are
they willing to be the object of their own principle?

Id
124. Allowing, of course, for among others the Leonora-type exception explored
above. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
125. See Larry May, The Socially Responsive Self: Social Theory and Professional

Ethics 26 (1996) ("At any given point in the life of a mature person, retaining
integrity will often involve some sacrifices so as to live up to one's principles.").
126. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text; see also Taylor, supra note 76,

at 157-58.
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and her desire to feather her own nest, may court hypocrisy. 27 But
again, most of us not only want others to see us as people with
integrity who do things for the right reasons; we also want to see
ourselves in this light.128 For this reason we may frequently face what
Lynne McFall calls "the temptation to redescription," that is, the
temptation to "rewrite... in various ways" the values and principles
to which we claim to be committed, to change the terms or introduce
exceptions in order to render permissible actions that conflict with
those values and principles. 9
This tendency to self-deception may be the single biggest obstacle
to integrity. It prevents honest scrutiny of our own motives, requires
that certain ideas be permanently excluded from our minds,' 30 and
prevents us from fitting comfortably, without tension, into ourselves.
The practice of self-deception thus precludes the possibility of
becoming an integrated whole, a state of being which is the essence of
integrity. 31
127. See Christine McKinnon, Hypocrisy, with a Note on Integrity, 28 Am. Phil. Q.
321, 322-26 (1991). McKinnon notes that "the hypocrite is one who desires to be
judged more favourably than she deserves to be, according to the prevailing
standards" and that "she uses the standards and judgments that comprise our system
of morality in order to get for herself some unmerited glory or to escape some
deserved reproaches." Id. at 323.
128. See Rostain, supra note 72, at 964 (noting "people's intense need to think well
of themselves-that is to view themselves as decent, reasonable people who care
about doing the right thing").
129. McFall, supra note 75, at 7. In contrast to McFall, Bela Szabados understands
self-deception not as a rewriting of the principles to which we claim to subscribe, but
rather a redescription of the evidence with which we are confronted. See Bela
Szabados, Self-Deception, 4 Can. J. Phil. 51, 66-68 (1974) [hereinafter Szabados, SelfDeception]; Bela Szabados, Wishful Thinking and Self-Deception, 33 Analysis 201,
204-05 (1973) [hereinafter Szabados, Wishful Thinking]. One who is not selfdeceived, Szabados explains, "takes the evidence that he has for the proposition as
grounds for its truth," whereas the self-deceiver, "prompted by non-truth-centered
considerations"-that is, by reasons that lead him to want the truth to be other than
what it is-"proceeds to explain away and reinterpret the evidence to satisfy some
emotional need." Szabados, Self-Deception, supra, at 63. The self-deceiver generally
fails to recognize that he is motivated by reasons that have nothing to do with the
truth, but if this crosses his mind, he explains it away. Id. It is for this reason,
Szabados argues, that "lies tend to breed lies and self-deception tends to breed selfdeception." Szabados, Wishful Thinking, supra, at 205; see also Daniel Putman, Virtue
and Self-Deception, 25 S. J. Phil. 549, 554-55 (1987) (arguing that self-deception is
inconsistent with integrity because it requires that the self-deceived live "a lie" in a
way that precludes the "unity of the life narrative"). It bears emphasizing that the
motivation of "non-truth-centered reasons" is not incidental to self-deception but
arguably constitutive of it. As Szabados notes, "[o]ne can be self-deceived only about
matters in which one has a personal stake. What one can be self-deceived about must
link up with one's wants, hopes, fears and emotional needs." Szabados, SelfDeception,supra, at 67.
130. See Putman, supra note 129, at 554-55 (explaining that "[slelf-deception
produces 'gaps' in the continuity of one's self-expression and self-understanding").
131. See Richard C. Prust, PersonalIntegrity and Moral Value, 12 Personalist F.
147, 155-56 (1996) ("If someone could project a single realistic coherent narrative in
which everything she is presently doing and intending to do (again, as she presently
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B. Integrity and Rhode's Lawyers
In Part I above, I suggested that the possibility of ethical lawyering
on Rhode's model requires that lawyers be people of integrity.
Having sketched a portrait of integrity, I am now in a position to
demonstrate the basis of this claim.
Recall that on Rhode's view, ethical lawyering means that lawyers
recognize the contextual nature of justice and commit themselves to
determining in each case what justice requires. For Rhode, this
process requires lawyers to weigh and consider all the interests at
stake in a particular case, including the likely consequences of
available actions, and to make a judgment about what justice requires
on this basis. As we have seen, Rhode offers no overarching principle
to guide these deliberations, for she recognizes that individual lawyers
will subscribe to different moral principles and conceptions of justice.
All that matters is that lawyers subscribe to some moral principles and
conception
of
justice- "consistent,
disinterested,
and
generalizable" 13 -and that they are willing to act on those principles
and conceptions in their professional lives.
Rhode's construction, in short, is a recipe for lawyering with
integrity. For if practitioners of this ethic are to be able-and
willing-to make the kind of discretionary judgments as to what
justice requires that Rhode emphasizes-if they are to assess the
situation from the various competing perspectives and determine
which course would be the most morally defensible, regardless of
whether this course promotes or compromises their own selfinterest-they must have a steadfast commitment to achieving justice,
whatever the cost to themselves. This steadfastness to moral principle
even at the risk of negative consequences to oneself is the first key
trait of the person of integrity. At the same time, Rhode's expectation
that her lawyers will be flexible and approach each situation with a
commitment to evaluating it on its own terms requires that they adopt
the method of moral reflection which is characteristic of people of
integrity, that is, the deliberative flexibility that allows for the
weighing and considering of all interests at stake and all available
options against a clear sense of what justice requires, with the
recognition that a given situation might challenge one's principled
conception of justice and thus that the appropriate course might well
be one that the lawyer could not have known in advance.
And there is more. On Rhode's view, recall, these lawyers need not
share a common view of what justice requires; it is enough that they
intends realizing it) gets accomplished, that success, let me contend, would amount to

her emergence as a person of integrity.").
132. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 67 ("An advocate could not simply retreat into

some fixed conception of role that denies personal accountability for public
consequences or that unduly privileges clients' and lawyers' own interests.").
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themselves have a clear conception of their own as to what is moral
and just, a conception that they are committed to vindicating through
their own actions even at a personal price. Rhode's lawyers, that is,
must have some moral conception of their own to employ in these
deliberations, some conception sufficiently clearly understood that it
may be effectively applied when the circumstances require, but this
moral conception need not be the same as that held by others. This
expectation, too, as we have seen, is consistent with integrity: The
person of integrity possesses a clear sense of his or her own moral
values and principles and is willing to vindicate these values and
principles even at a cost to himself, yet there is no requirement that
this moral sense line up with the prevailing view.
There are, it is true, some restrictions on the moral conception to
which a person of integrity-or an ethical lawyer on Rhode's modelis committed. As we saw above, the moral principles to which a
person of integrity is committed must satisfy what Taylor called "the
'
demands of consistency,"133
that is, the demand that they be
consistently applied whoever the beneficiary.1 34 This requirement,
which we suggested may also be understood as the demand that the
be
moral principles to which the person of integrity is committed
136
universalizable, 135 is reflected equally on Rhode's model.
In sum: Practitioners of Rhode's ethic of lawyering must maintain a
consistent commitment to clear, universalizable values and principles.
They must have the capacity for careful deliberation and reflection.
They must be open-minded, reasonable in their assessments, and
flexible in their judgments. And they must be committed to acting
according to their values and principles whatever the consequences of
so doing, even if the promotion of their self-interest would dictate
otherwise. 37 What's more, the very possibility of these capacities
presupposes a high level of moral maturity and of self-knowledge
which, as we saw above, are among the hallmarks of a person of
integrity. For one who shares a commitment to Rhode's conception
of ethical lawyering, the 13promotion
of integrity among practitioners
8
thus seems to be the key.
133. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text; Graham, supra note 79, at 157.
134. A person of integrity, in other words, will act to realize his values and
vindicate his principles whether it is he himself or others who stand to gain from his
doing so.
135. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
136. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 67.
137. See id. (arguing that lawyers' conduct "should be justifiable under consistent,
disinterested, and generalizable principles"). This last point, that the lawyer of
integrity must be willing to act to vindicate the values to which she is expressly
committed even where doing so is against her self-interest, is particularly important in
a context, like lawyering for paying clients, where the temptation to act in ways that
feather one's own nest at the expense of others is ever-present.
138. These requirements line up precisely with the key character traits of the
person of integrity identified in the above discussion. See supra Part II.A.
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Yet is integrity enough for Rhode? For although at times she
claims for her model sufficient flexibility to accommodate a range of
moral views, at other times she seems to insist that ethical lawyers
subscribe to a particular moral vision, with content specified by Rhode
herself. 3 9 Given, as we have seen, that integrity itself lacks a specific
content and that it is open to people of integrity to act on a broad
range of values and principles, Rhode's move to specify in some detail
certain of the values to which lawyers must be committed seems to
demand of lawyers not merely integrity but integrity plus, integrity in
the service of values she herself considers worthy. But integrity phs is
very different than integrity simpliciter. While the latter reflects a
moral capacity that is open to cultivation by each morally mature
individual, the former requires not moral maturity but enforced moral
conformity whether or not such conformity reflects one's own views, a
state that is neither appealing as an ideal nor promising as a matter of
policy.
This concern, however, is misplaced, for Rhode need not smuggle in
a particular moral agenda to support the values she specifies as
necessarily among the commitments of a lawyer with integrity. To the
contrary, she is supported in this respect by several aspects of integrity
itself. First, the values and commitments of a person of integrity must
meet the demands of consistency-that is, they must be capable of
being universalized. This standard requires that lawyers of integrity as
a matter of course commit themselves, in the way Rhode advocates, to
the support and promotion of "a just and effective legal system," and
the enhancement of "core values such as honesty, fairness, and good
faith on which that system depends." 1 For as we saw above in our
discussion of Rhode's own stipulation that the values and principles of
the ethical lawyer must be universalizable-a stipulation analogous to
the requirement that the moral commitments of a person of integrity
must satisfy the "demands of consistency" 14 1-if everyone operating
within the legal system's institutional framework acted in ways that
undermine the 14system's
core values, the system itself would not
2
long.
for
survive
Second, although it is possible to conceive of individuals who
subscribe to values and principles that others would find objectionable
as nonetheless acting with integrity, we have also recognized as a
further key hallmark of integrity a consistency between a person's
actions and their professed commitments. Thus it is not open to
139. As we have seen, Rhode insists that lawyers "have responsibilities to prevent
unnecessary harm to third parties, to promote a just and effective legal system, and to
respect core values such as honesty, fairness, and good faith on which that system
depends." Rhode, supra note 2, at 67; see also id. at 18.
140. Id. at 67.

141. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
142- See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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members of the legal profession-each of whom takes an oath to
uphold the values of a profession that explicitly conceives of each of
its members not only as "a representative of clients" but also as "an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
' "play[ing] a vital role in the
responsibility for the quality of justice,"143
preservation of our society"4"-to hold themselves out as licensed
practitioners while at the same time disclaiming the responsibility for
or commitment to ensuring a fair and effective justice system. Those
lawyers who take an oath are for this reason obliged to act within the
system honestly, in good faith, and with due consideration towards
those who are vulnerable to harm.
But what of Rhode's stipulation that lawyers must commit
themselves to preventing unnecessary harm to third parties? Could
one not argue that lawyers, who by accepting the representation of
clients implicitly pledge loyalty to those clients, make no such
representations to third parties and thus owe no such duty to them?
And if so, on what basis may an advocate of Rhode-style ethical
lawyering claim that lawyering with integrity, without more, creates
such an obligation? The answer, I suggest, lies in Graham's insight
that people of integrity must be morally trustworthy, in the sense of
being "in proper relation to others,"'45 of having "a genuine regard for
the worth of the person." 46 As I suggested above, this trait seems a
necessary concomitant of any person whose values or principles would
satisfy the demands of consistency. For the demands of consistency
require of a person of integrity that she act consistently in defense of
her own values or principles, whether it is she or someone else who
stands to benefit, a requirement that excludes, as we saw, both
Taylor's deceitful manipulator and Putnam's egoist. These demands
thus require of the person of integrity that she act according to
principles consistent with moral trustworthiness, which signifies, at the
very least, respect for "the humanity in each individual regardless of
the individual's relation to oneself." 47 Such a disposition at a
minimum will reflect a commitment on the part of the person of
integrity to protecting innocent third parties from unnecessary harm,
which is precisely the value Rhode demands of her ethical lawyers
whatever their particular conception of justice.
Inevitably, there will be tension-and even inconsistency- between
a lawyer's multiple obligations to the client, to the system, and to
society as a whole.148 Indeed, a lawyer who takes her responsibilities
143. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct pmbl. (2000).
144. Id. pmbl.
145. Graham, supra note 79, at 246.
146. Id. at 247 n.23.
147. Id.
148. These tensions are explicitly acknowledged in the Preamble to the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that "[v]irtually all difficult ethical
problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
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seriously will spend her career trying to effect a fair balance between
these multiple obligations. 149 But-and here is the key point-once a
lawyer joins the profession and willingly accepts the benefits and
obligations of such membership, there are certain values and
commitments she can no longer disclaim. For this reason, too, it is
unnecessary for Rhode to smuggle in a commitment to the particular
substantive values she names and demand that ethical lawyers act
consistently with them; lawyers' own representations, performatively
implied by assuming the status of lawyer, give rise to this demand.
For these reasons, Rhode's ethical lawyers need not practice
according to the demands of integrity plus. To ensure that lawyers
commit themselves to the particular values Rhode highlights, integrity
simpliciterwill suffice.
The inevitability of conflicts among the values and commitments of
a lawyer of integrity suggests the nature of the challenge facing such a
lawyer: She must do her best to determine how to balance the various
interests at stake in any given case, while at the same time
representing her clients fairly and remaining true to the range of
values and principles to which she is committed.Y, That lawyers will
themselves at times pay a price, in terms of lost fees and lost clients,
for their refusal to advance certain of their clients' goals, does not, on
Rhode's account, constitute sufficient reason for lawyers to act
otherwise. For Rhode expects that ethical lawyers, as people of
integrity, will willingly pay a price for acting consistently with their
stated principles.
There will admittedly be times, on Rhode's view, when the lawyer
concludes that no legitimate purpose would be served by withdrawal,
and continues the representation. 1 There will also be times when the
ethical lawyer falls short, allowing the pull of self-interest or the desire
to avoid conflict to overcome the recognition that her moral
commitments oblige her to act other than she does. Neither of these
eventualities, however, destroys integrity, for integrity does not
demand action if the situation does not call for it, and if a lawyer
system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning
a satisfactory living." Model Rules pmbl.
149. As Kronman eloquently puts it, "[a] lawyer who is doing his job well dwells in
the tension between private interest and public good, and never overcomes it."
Anthony T. Kronman, The Law as a Profession, in Ethics in Practice, supra note 46,
at 29, 32.
150. It is for this reason that the lawyer of integrity must cultivate the quality that
Kronman calls "practical wisdom"- the excellence of the person who deliberates well.
Kronman, Lost Lawyer, supra note 3, at 43. According to Kronman, a lawyer of
practical wisdom, which in the ideal form represents Kronman's ideal of the "lawyerstatesman," shows "a certain calmness in his deliberations, together with a balanced
sympathy toward the various concerns of which his situation (or the situation of his
client) requires that he take account. These are qualities as much of feeling as of
thought." Id. at 16.
151. Id' at 69.
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occasionally falls short of her own ethical aspirations, if she lets
herself down in this way, self-criticism, self-examination, and perhaps
self-reproach are more appropriate responses than abandoning
commitments altogether.152 Certainly, this latter case at least would
represent a moral misstep, but such missteps should not be taken to
signal the utter failure of integrity. For there is surely a difference
between one who occasionally acts contrary to principle and, at such
times, acknowledges her own shortcomings, responds with a searching
inquiry into why she did what she did, and commits to doing better
next time, and one who casually abandons her principles whenever
self-interest dictates. This difference is a hopeful one for those whose
conception of ethical lawyering depends on the possibility of integrity,
for it suggests that the key is not moral perfection, but rather a goodfaith commitment to try to do better, and the willingness of individual
lawyers to be honest-honest with others, but most crucially with
themselves- about their own motives and aims. Some lawyers, it is
true, may pretend conformity to the standards of this ethic, perhaps to
improve their reputations or in efforts to mask self-interested conduct.
But it is precisely the absence of any conceivable enforcement
mechanism, or even any effective external check, that makes
individual character so important to the possibility of ethical
lawyering. Particularly in the absence of institutional change designed
to promote ethical lawyering of this sort, there is little to guard against
this sort of insincerity, save the integrity of the individual actor and his
personal commitment to ethical practice.
C. Obstacles to Lawyering With Integrity
Above, I have attempted to show that the possibility of ethical
lawyering on Rhode's model depends on the moral character of the
lawyers themselves, and specifically that, in order to be successful, this
model requires the commitment of lawyers who possess the set of
character traits that comprise the moral quality we commonly refer to
as integrity. Although my focus here is on the work of Deborah
Rhode, my contention is that other contextual conceptions of ethical
lawyering-and here I am thinking most centrally of David Luban's
moral activism 153 and William Simon's ethical discretion in
152. See Calhoun, supra note 80, at 250 ("Surely, not all weak-willed failures to act
on one's own best judgment signal a lack of integrity. Breaking a diet privately
embarked upon because one is lazy, or craving sugar, or just plain hungry is weak
willed, but not necessarily a cost to integrity, especially if the person reproaches
himself for his weakness. Self-reproach is exactly what one expects of the person of
integrity who lets himself down."); see also Kronman, MoralPhilosophy, supra note 3,
at 1757 ("[A) sound upbringing and a good moral character.., make one peculiarly
liable to feelings of shame.... [T]he schism in one's character that shame reveals
constitutes a lack of integrity, which those with a good character are likely to find
especially disturbing and be particularly anxious to repair.").
153. See Luban, supra note 5, at 160-74.
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lawyering'4-are equally dependent on the quality of integrity among
the practicing lawyers to whom these theories are directed, not only to
incline those lawyers to seek an ethical practice, but also to make it
possible for them to realize the demands of such a practice in the dayto-day.
Yet if I am right about this, what does it say for the possibility of
ethical lawyering on this model that in reality, most of us in the course
of our daily lives will never come close to achieving the high standard
of conduct that I associate above with persons of integrity? None of
us is perfect; none of us is without moral weakness or failing. If it is
true that the alternative to the standard zealous advocacy view of the
lawyer's role is a model the success of which depends on the
possibility of lawyers achieving some unattainable moral standard,' 5
should we not just concede that such an alternative will never take,
and that we would thus be better off thinking of how to make the
practice of zealous advocacy more ethical? Or, put another way, if
"ought implies can," are not conceptions of ethical lawyering akin to
Rhode's at best misguided and at worst a distraction from the shared
end, which is how, realistically, to make lawyers more ethical?
This objection appears to gain even greater force when we consider
what this model demands of one who concludes that the ends of his
client are contrary to the interests of justice as he understands them:
that he withdraw from the representation, or even, in the extreme,
that he act contrary to the client's interests. How, exactly, it might be
objected, is one who adopts this approach supposed to make a living?
to establish a reputation? to build a practice? Clients will not exactly
flock to a lawyer who creates obstacles to the achievement of client
aims when those aims strike the lawyer as morally objectionable. And
why should they? From this perspective, Rhode seems to dismiss too
quickly the question raised by former Judge Marvin Frankel: "'Why
should the client pay for loyalties divided between himself and
[justice]"'? 5 6 In answer, Rhode maintains that "[c]lients should pay,"

notwithstanding that the lawyer they pay may ultimately refuse to
promote their interests, "because clients as a group ultimately
benefit."''5
Specifically, Rhode asserts that "constraints on
partisanship" imposed on ethical lawyers by her model will "reinforce
154. See Simon, supra note 5, at 138-62; see generally Simon, supra note 62.
155. Luban too acknowledges the impossibility of expecting lawyers to conform

easily to the high moral standards set by contextual conceptions like his moral
activism. Discussing the possibility that an ethical lawyer on his model might be led
to withdraw from representation or even to betray a client's projects "if the lawyer
persists in the conviction that they are immoral or unjust," Luban argues that,
"[ujnlike the standard conception of the lawyer's role, moral activism accepts these
possibilities without flinching. Without flinching much, at any rate." Luban, supra

note 5, at 174.
156. Rhode, supra note 2, at 69.
157. Id.
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[the clients'] better instincts and maintain a well-functioning legal
system.' 15 8 From the perspective of a lawyer focused on building her
practice, however, this response is likely to be dissatisfying. Clients, in
short, do not pay lawyers to help them hone their moral sense, nor to
secure the long-term health of the legal system. They pay for help to
get things done. And if the lawyer they hire has too much integrity to
provide this help, the clients will simply go elsewhere.
There is no getting around the fact that Rhode's model, in its ideal
form, demands a high moral standard. And it is also true that the
model does expect the ethical lawyer to sacrifice professional selfinterest in those cases when being true to her values and principles so
demands. Given the undeniable fact that at least some lawyers may
be unwilling in practice to act on principle if doing so will compromise
their financial self-interest, the question we must therefore confront is
whether the demand that a lawyer put her self-interest to one side
when justice so requires necessarily negates the value of the model.
This is a fair question. As a definitive challenge to the model of
ethical lawyering we have been exploring, however, it falls wide of the
mark for one very simple reason: The demand that lawyers at times
place their ethical obligations above their financial interests is
constitutive not merely of contextual models of ethical lawyering like
Rhode's, but of all models of ethical lawyering, including the standard
zealous advocacy view. To be sure, the zealous advocacy model may
in general be more consistently in line with a lawyer's financial
interests, because for the most part it dictates that lawyers do
precisely what their clients want, notwithstanding that they themselves
may have moral qualms about the proposed course-an approach
clients may be expected to like and willing to pay for. But this
conjunction between a client's aims and a lawyer's self-interest is by
no means always present, and the same financial incentives that are
likely to lead lawyers away from achieving the standards of ethical
lawyering embodied by Rhode's model can also act in practice to
compromise the willingness of self-professed "zealous advocates" to
live up to their ethical obligations. Zealous advocates, for example,
are expected to prioritize their clients', interests over all others, even
their own. Yet as Rhode herself documents, the obligations of
"zealous advocacy" are in practice frequently used as a justification
for "turning litigation into an expensive war of attrition" 59 that
increases legal fees-an outcome very much in the interests of
lawyers-without necessarily serving the long-term interests of
clients. 16° In such cases, a stated commitment to zealous advocacy on
158. Id. at 69-70.
159. Id. at 84.
160. See also Richard Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, The Moral Compass of the
American Lawyer 81 (1999) (quoting an unnamed lawyer to the effect that "if billable
hours are the engine of the firm, zealous advocacy is the gas pedal").
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the client's behalf simply operates as a cover for strategies by which
lawyers run up fees at the client's expense; that is, for strategies which
compromise the lawyer's ethical obligations to the client in order to
serve the lawyer's own self-interest. On the zealous advocacy model,
moreover, lawyers are obliged to restrain from assisting clients to the
extent that doing so would lead either lawyers or their clients to run
afoul of the law. But as the recent Enron scandal nicely illustrates,
even lawyers ostensibly committed to the zealous advocacy model will
be tempted by the desire to preserve clients' fees to continue assisting
their clients even when doing so may run counter to the law.
In short, no defensible theory of professional ethics can guarantee a
correlation between ethical action and the financial interests of the
actor, and most if not all lawyers face an inevitable "tension between
doing good and doing well."16, The fact that practitioners may decline
to adopt an ethic that appears most theoretically defensible and most
consistent with the stated values of the profession thus cannot be a
reason to abandon the search for such an ethic, but must simply be

taken as evidence that there is a much greater gap between the
professed commitments of the profession and the actual behavior of
its members.'1

161. David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for PracticingLawyers: SeparatingIdeals
from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 458, 472 (1994) (reviewing Anthony
T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: FailingIdeals of the Legal Profession). Wilkins notes
that young lawyers in particular have grown to expect careers in which "there is no
tension between doing good and doing well." Id. But as he explains,
This promise... has always been illusory. Nineteenth-century lawyers were
able to submerge the inevitable tension between public service and private
gain by erecting artificial barriers to competition, monopolizing the debate
over the goals and operation of legal institutions, exploiting their knowledge
about the intricacies of the legal system, and shielding many of their
practices from public view.... Today's lawyers, however, can no longer rely
on these tactics to shield themselves from the conflicting demands inherent
in their dual role as "advocates" and "officers of the court." They must face
a real tradeoff between the comfortable lifestyles they have grown to expect
and the public commitments that confer honor and prestige on their chosen
occupation. It is no wonder that many practitioners find this conflict
disquieting.
Id. at 472-73.
162. This gap, it bears noting, suggests a level of hypocrisy that may well explain
the considerable public hostility toward lawyers that so troubles bar leaders.
Hypocrisy, according to Christine McKinnon, is the act of "manipulating others'
perceptions of one's motivations" in order to benefit oneself while being judged
favorably by the standards that others hold dear. McKinnon, supra note 127, at 323.
This is precisely what a lawyer does when she pledges to her client the absolute
loyalty to his interests embodied in the zealous advocacy model while at the same
time taking advantage of the autonomy a lawyer enjoys and the trust (or naivetd) of
the client to engage in strategies to, say, increase her billable hours in ways that do
not benefit the client or that the client could be expected to veto if he were made
aware of them. For descriptions of such strategies, see infra note 215; see also Zitrin
& Langford, supra note 160, at 80-87; Rhode, supra note 2, at 169-74.
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If it is true that many lawyers in practice prioritize the pursuit of
profit and give little or no consideration to the ethical cost of so doing,
this fact will of course be relevant to any efforts to implement the
model of ethical lawyering which after due deliberation appears most
defensible." 3 And it is certainly the case, as I argue below, that the
prioritizing of profit maximization by practicing lawyers is at odds
with the possibility of integrity. But if there is any value to developing
an ideal of ethical lawyering, it is important to distinguish reasons for
rejecting an ethic on its own terms from potential problems with its
implementation. As Graham reminds us, the fact of human fallibility
means that very few of us will actually possess integrity in its ideal
form."6 For most of us, the best we can hope for is what Graham calls
"integrity in the making." 165 Viewed in this light, to practice integrity
is not to act in conformity with integrity's demands as a person
already possessed of this quality, but literally to "practice," that is, to
repeatedly attempt to act consistently with its requirements in order
to improve our general capacity to conform to its demands.
It is in this spirit, I suggest, that we ought to understand the model
of ethical lawyering-of lawyering with integrity-found in the work
of Rhode, Luban, Simon, and others. For this model to be of use to
lawyers who aspire to an ethical standard not reflected in the
traditional zealous advocacy conception, it is not necessary that its
practitioners never fall short. Instead, ethical practice on this model
should be viewed, in the spirit of Graham's "integrity in the making,"
as an effort to develop the character traits that will eventually, it is
hoped, lead naturally into greater conformity with the standards of
ethical conduct the model represents."s
In Part III, I explore what it might take to foster the traits of
integrity among lawyers in practice and identify some of the common
practices of the legal profession that threaten to undermine its
possibility. My purpose is to begin to consider the prospects for
ethical lawyering as I have understood it here, but to the extent that
the true zealous advocate must also be a person of integrity, this
discussion should prove as relevant to those who prefer the standard
conception as it is to those who reject it. 167
163. See infra Part III for further exploration of this issue.
164. Graham, supra note 79, at 250-51.

165. Id. at 250.
166. As we have seen, Rhode's model is premised on the consequentialist
calculation that those who consistently fall short in these attempts will do better
overall than if they made no effort at all in this direction. See supra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text.

167. This discussion suggests that even lawyers for whom zealous advocacy is the
preferred ethical model have need of at least some of the virtues we have here
associated with integrity, in particular a commitment to consistency between word
and deed and a willingness to stand by one's stated principles and commitments even
when one's own interests might suffer as a result. Absent these qualities, lawyers who
claim the abiding loyalty to the client's interests that marks a zealous advocate can
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III. LEGAL PRACTICE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF INTEGRITY

The conventional story told about integrity, and moral character in
general, is that it is fixed in childhood or, at the very least, before the

onset of adulthood, and that by the time you're an adult you either
have it or you don't."6s From this, one might well conclude that there
is no point in trying to foster the conditions for its cultivation among
lawyers, who are invariably past the age of moral development and
thus immune to such efforts. But although it may be true that certain
of our moral habits and tendencies are formed early on,'" this is not
the same as saying that subsequent social structures and processes
play no part in shaping or influencing our ethical capacities and
behavior. Nor could such a position be sustained against the
considerable evidence that frameworks of social interaction, including
those in which professionals practice, determine to a great extent our
ethical perceptions and behavior. 7 '
Lawyers as a group are particularly well-placed to recognize the
extent to which ethical identity can be shaped well into adulthood,
given that each member of this group will have experienced firsthand
the power of an institution to influence one's sense of self. For before
one can join the legal profession, one must spend three years in law
school, which, in addition to providing an education in legal structure,
language, and method, represents a socialization process powerful
enough to transform lay people into lawyers. 71 I do not here claim
easily slide into hypocrisy. For discussion of the vice of hypocrisy as it relates to the
legal profession, see supra note 162.
168. Kronman, for example, concludes that "[bly the time a person reaches the age
of twenty or so... the habits that define his or her character have already been
formed." Kronman, Moral Philosophy,supra note 3, at 1755-56. This is one argument
sometimes offered as to why the teaching of professional ethics is hopeless. See Derek
Bok, Can HigherEducation FosterHigher Morals?, 66 Bus. & Soc'y Rev. 4 (1988).
169. See Kronman, Moral Philosophy,supra note 3, at 1755-56.
170. See, eg., Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers
(1988) (demonstrating the extent to which the moral perceptions of white collar
managers are informed by the shape of the institutional structures in which they
operate); Katherine S. Newman, Falling From Grace: The Experience of Downward
Mobility in the American Middle Class (1988) (demonstrating the extent to which
individual perceptions and value judgments related to job loss are a function of the
institutional context in which the job loss occurred); Erving Goffman, On the
Characteristicsof Total Institutions, in Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of
Mental Patients and Other Inmates 1 (1961) (explaining the constitutive effects on
individual "values, identities, and practices" of inhabiting a "total institution"); see
also Rostain, supra note 72, at 970 (calling for "research into the effects of
specialization by area, client and task, [and] firm culture and organization" as a way
of "understand[ing] the process of value and attitude formation in lawyers").
171. Certainly, law students vary in the extent to which they give themselves up to
this process and thus the extent to which they have, by the time of graduation,
absorbed the professional identity of the lawyer. On the law school socialization
process, see my Note, Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification of Law
Students, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2027 (1998); see also Sharon Dolovich, Leaving the Law
Behind, 20 Harv. Women's LJ. 313, 326-30 (1997) (reviewing Patricia Williams' The
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that the powerful socializing effects of law school necessarily effect
permanent changes.172 Rather, I mention the power of law school to
structure the moral perspectives of those who experience it merely as
evidence that even as adults our identities are capable of great shifts,
and that the engine of these shifts is often to be found in the social
structures in which we operate. The danger, of course, is that
perspectives may well be shifted in ways that undermine rather than
enhance ethical character or behavior, and those concerned with
improving the prospects of ethical lawyering may find this possibility
particularly disconcerting. On the positive side, the potential for
ethical change through the shaping of social structures and practices
makes it possible for those committed to ethical lawyering on the
contextual model to think about ways to promote among practitioners
the character traits on which, I have been arguing, the possibility of
such lawyering depends.
Admittedly, to suggest that ethical lawyering may be promoted in
this way presupposes that the traits I associate above with integrity are
amenable to influence by the structures of legal practice. This,
however, I take to be plainly the case.173 For although many aspects of
one's moral character are obviously shaped long before one enters the
practice of law, given that many of the issues and questions that
inform the way these traits are manifested in a lawyer's professional
life will never have been confronted in one's pre-law life, it stands to
reason that the culture and character of the context in which one
practices, and in particular the attitudes of senior colleagues who offer
a ready model for young lawyers just entering practice, can have a
considerable influence on the eventual shape of one's professional
identity as well as one's professional habits. Whether, for example,
one approaches client representation as if one is an empty shell-what
I think of as an "empty suit and a brain"-prepared to be an uncritical
conduit for the achievement of the client's interests, or instead as a
reflective moral agent who listens with an open mind but also
considers the various implications of what the client seeks and comes
Rooster's Egg) (describing the process whereby law schools teach law students to
suppress their radical political impulses in favor of a more "rational" approach to
legal and political problems); Robert Granfield, Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of
Law at Harvard and Beyond (1992). For an account of the powerful forces of
socialization and professionalization in medical school, see Howard S. Becker et al.,
Boys in White: Student Culture in Medical School (1961).
172. To the contrary, I share Rostain's sense that when it comes to the construction
of a lawyer's "commitments and beliefs.... professionalization in legal practice soon
eclipses the influence of legal education." Rostain, supra note 72, at 969-70.
173. Even Kronman, who believes that "[bly the time a person reaches the age of
twenty or so. . . the habits that define his or her character have already been formed,"
Kronman, Moral Philosophy, supra note 3, at 1755-56, takes as a given that the social
structures of practice-both in the provision of role models and in the demands made
on individual lawyers-can have a great influence on the moral character of lawyers.
See Kronman, Lost Lawyer, supra note 3, at 271-314.
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to one's own conclusions about what is morally appropriate, is not a
trait that can be crystallized in a particular moral agent prior to the
commencement of practice. Before entering practice one can (and
probably should) consider in the abstract the disposition with which a
legal practitioner ought to approach clients' requests for legal services,
but it is not until one is faced with actual clients-and, more
importantly, sees how the other lawyers on whom one depends for
guidance and advice view their own professional obligations-that
one can begin to cultivate a particular approach to this endeavor.
Certainly the capacity for reflection and deliberation (or lack thereof)
will predate legal practice. But what one makes of this capacity in the
practice of law will depend to a considerable degree on the example
set by role models, and on the extent to which one's practice context is
designed to foster-or undermine-one's aptitude in this regard. 74
The same can be said for the substance of the values and principles
to which a lawyer is committed. Although it is true that the personal
value system to which any particular lawyer subscribes will have been
established prior to his or her entry into practice, it is also the case
that entry into the legal profession brings with it the need to confront,
consider, and make a determination about the obligation of lawyers
with respect to a host of values that individual entrants into the
profession are not likely to have seriously considered in the past. To
what extent are lawyers obliged to effectuate the values ideally
realized by a properly functioning adversary system? Must lawyers
act in ways that strengthen the legal institutions on which the rule of
law depends, 75 or is this task solely the responsibility of the
legislature? Are lawyers more than just agents of their clients'
desires? What exactly does it mean to be an "officer of the court" or a
"public citizen with a special responsibility for the quality of
justice?"'7 6

And what do these roles require?

Furthermore, in

addition to these questions which new lawyers must answer for
themselves, lawyers entering practice will for the first time be
confronted with the fact that, in the course of providing professional
services, they have the power to conduct themselves in ways that
generate considerable consequences for individuals and even entire
communities, parties who may have had no direct involvement in the

174. See Kronman's discussion of law firms for a much more detailed exploration

than I have here provided of the way law firm practice may foster or undermine one's
capacity for what Kronman calls "practical wisdom," a quality with a strong family

resemblance to what I have labeled "deliberative flexibility." Kronman, Lost Lawyer,
supra note 3, at 271-314; see also supra notes 85, 150.
175. Gordon advances this latter view eloquently in his essay, Why Lawyers Can't
JustBe Hired Guns. See Gordon, supra note 46.
176. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct pmbl. (2000) ("A lawyer is a representative

of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.").
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legal matter at hand.' 7 In particular, a law license offers the prospect
of supporting actions and projects undertaken in the service of one's
clients with the state-backed coercive force of a court order, and the
opportunity to be viewed as the voice of authority in many public fora.
Although some practitioners will remain unaffected by the prospect of
this power, proceeding to enact through their practices the value
system they brought with them to the law, others will be moved to
reflect on previously held values in light of the power a law license
carries-and for members of this latter group the structures of
practice are bound to have considerable influence on the conclusions
eventually drawn in this regard.
Let me put these claims in terms of the portrait of integrity
developed above: What I am suggesting is that, notwithstanding that
the constituents of moral character may be formed well before the bar
swearing-in, the structures of legal practice, and in particular one's
early experiences of legal practice, stand to influence considerably
both the capacity for the exercise of independent judgment and
deliberative flexibility and the substance of the values and principles
to which one is committed. But what of the remaining traits of
integrity? What of the willingness of moral actors to act consistently
with their own values and principles even if to do so risks
compromising their own interests, or of the tendency of moral actors
to be honest with themselves about their own motivations? Here, too,
it seems highly probable that professional context matters, particularly
early on in a legal career.
Do one's colleagues encourage
consideration of one's personal integrity when formulating client
strategies, even if professional interests might suffer? Is there a
recognition that one's integrity has value, not only in terms of
professional reputation, but for oneself as a coherent moral agent, and
that this is a legitimate concern even for professionals who seek a
good living? Do existing structures encourage honesty and fairdealing, or do they reward manipulative or deceptive practices?
Although the individual capacity to act on moral commitments in
spite of personal costs and with a minimum of self-deception may be
shaped at an early stage of moral development, the answers to these
questions will determine to a great extent whether individuals can
realize this capacity in their professional lives'TS-and thus whether
177. True, such lawyers will invariably have brought to practice a previously
developed and deeply ingrained sense of their own moral responsibilities vis-a-vis
other people, communities, and the environment in which they live. But being a legal
professional means reckoning for the first time with state-conferred powers that, if

not necessarily outstripping previous potential to have an impact on the world, are
certainly different in kind than the powers at the disposal of a lay person.
178. Rostain's illuminating discussion of the human psychological tendencies to
conformism (the taking of "cues about the propriety of [our] conduct from others")
and self-justification (our need to "'justify' [ourselves], to find explanations that are

consistent with [our] self-conception as a decent person") strongly reinforces this
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Rhode's alternative conception of ethical lawyering represents for
individual practitioners an unreachable ideal or a live option.
If I am right that the structures and practices of one's professional
context can, particularly early on in one's career, have a considerable
effect on the development of one's professional character either
toward or away from the possibility of integrity, what follows? For
one thing, it becomes incumbent on job-seeking lawyers, particularly
early on in their careers, to learn as much as possible about the ethical
culture of the employment contexts they are considering joining as
well as the ethical character of the lawyers with whom they will be
working. particularly those lawyers in supervisory roles. Granted, not
all lawyers seeking employment have the luxury of choice, especially
during an economic downturn, but to the extent that they do, my
arguments here suggest that those individuals who care about the
prospects for developing as an ethical lawyer would do well to seek
placement where their capacity for lawyering with integrity will be
fostered rather than undermined.
Yet personal initiative can only take one so far. If I am right that
integrity is the key to ethical lawyering, and that social structure and
practices can contribute to the fostering or undermining of one's
potential for integrity, those who want to enhance the ethical
character of the bar must seek to identify, in order to alter, those
structures and practices that make it difficult for most lawyers-and in
particular new lawyers, who tend to get their start in organizational
settings-to develop ethical traits consistent with the conception of
ethical lawyering we have here been exploring.
To which structures and practices ought we to look for this
purpose? The obvious place to start is with the rules of professional
responsibility,' to which legal ethics scholars tend to look when
thinking about how best to influence the collective behavior of
lawyers. And although, for reasons I will address shortly."' changes
to the rules cannot alone make the difference, there is nonetheless an
argument to be made that the rules should be rethought if the goal is
to foster the development and exercise of integrity among lawyers.
Our discussion of integrity is most relevant in the context of the
confidentiality rules, which address perhaps the most important and
far-reaching of a lawyer's professional obligations. As any observer of
the legal profession knows, the rules governing a lawyer's duty of
confidentiality have traditionally weighed extremely heavily on the
side of protecting client confidences, forbidding disclosure even when
keeping the secret could lead to serious harm or even death to
conclusion. reminding us that the possibility of integrity is as much a soctal and
psychological question as it is an ethical one. Rostain. supra note 72. at 964-66.
179. See generally Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct (2000): Model Code of Prof'i
Responsibility (1981).
180. See infra notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
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From the perspective of integrity, the

confidentiality rules thus present two problems. First, they deny
lawyers the possibility of exercising their own judgment and acting
consistently with their own moral commitments to decide when
disclosure is warranted. Such strictures, that is, force the lawyer to

give preference to the interests of clients even in cases where doing so
conflicts with the lawyer's most strongly held moral commitments,
short-circuiting the process of deliberative judgment by dictating the
outcome, whatever the lawyer might conclude on the basis of his own
moral sense to be the right course of action. In this way, a lawyer's
own moral character and moral judgment become irrelevant, not just
in the larger scheme, but to her own actions. She acts on the basis of
some other actor's dictates, not her own."m

Second, and as a

consequence, acting according to this scheme trains lawyers over time
to suppress the exercise of their own moral judgment and the
accompanying traits of the person of integrity: lawyers simply defer to
the client. Those who adhere mechanically, without reserving to
themselves the obligation of assessing in each case the moral
appropriateness of the rule's dictates, can be expected to see their
capacity for the traits that comprise integrity to atrophy with disuse.

Is this to say that any rules governing confidentiality will be at odds
with the goals of integrity? Not at all.183 But it is true that, from the
perspective of integrity, the preference in terms of institutional design
will be for broader discretion and fewer absolute rules in the
confidentiality context, 184 so that a greater space would open up for
181. See, e.g., R. 1.6(b) (providing exceptions to the rule against disclosure only in
limited circumstances); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e) (Deering 2001) (setting
forth an absolute prohibition on the disclosure of client confidences); see also Rhode,
supra note 2, at 106-15 (discussing a range of cases in which lawyers, by keeping
clients' confidential information, rendered third parties vulnerable to considerable
harm); supra note 29 and accompanying text.
182. To voice this concern is not the same as saying that the lawyer should feel free,
whenever she feels like it, to disclose her client's confidences. Plainly, a lawyer who is
acting in the interests of her client would reveal a confidence only with the greatest
reluctance, where there are considerable third-party interests at stake. My objection
is thus not to the norm itself but rather to its absolute character, and the unwillingness
to accord to lawyers the discretion to judge when justice requires deviation from the
norm. If a lawyer is not to be just an empty suit and a brain, but rather to be
recognized as a moral being in her own right-one who, as Rhode says, takes
"personal responsibility for the moral consequences of [her] professional actions," see
Rhode, supra note 2, at 66-67-she must be accorded the scope of action consistent
with such status. To accord discretion to disclose, in short, is not to insist or expect
that it be exercised lightly.
183. See supra note 181.
184. See R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation ... ."); Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code § 6068(e) ("It is the duty of an attorney ... [tjo maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or
her client."). The changes approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 2001
to the confidentiality provision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, allowing
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the exercise and development of a lawyer's own moral sense. To this,
one might well object that the content of the rules should be no
obstacle to the true person of integrity, who will act to promote her
principles regardless of the consequences, even where the violation is
clear and the penalty certain. Our concern, however, is not with
heralding instances of individual heroism, but rather with the

structures that promote or undermine the broad possibility of
integrity. And where there are absolute rules, rules that direct
behavior without encouraging critical evaluation of the circumstances,
these rules shape not only actions but also ways of thinking, signaling
that deference is the moral disposition most valued in the
profession."85 For this reason, one who is concerned with promoting
integrity will prefer rules that encourage lawyers to view themselves
as moral agents who must, as Rhode says, "accept personal
responsibility for the moral consequences of their professional
actions, 186 and not simply to defer to the wishes of their clients or
their colleagues.1 7 Certainly, to the extent that the confidentiality
rules-or other rules'ss-prevent lawyers from acting in ways that are
consistent with their own aberrational conceptions of justice, they
the possibility of disclosure "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm," represent a
considerable improvement over the prior more restrictive version and open up a
broader space within which the lawyer may exercise the qualities we have associated
with integrity. See R. 1.6(b)(1) (approved amended draft 2001); see also Jonathan D.
Glater, Lawyers May Reveal Secrets of Clients, Bar Group Rules, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
2001, at A12. In my view, these changes are to be welcomed, but they do not go far
enough. Also available for approval by the House of Delegates was a more farreaching proposal that would have allowed disclosure where the lawyers' services
were to be used, or had already been used, to perpetuate financial fraud "reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another."
R. 1.6(b) (approved amended draft 2001); see William Glaberson, Lawyers Consider
Easing Restriction on Client Secrecy, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2001, at Al; Glater, supra.
In rejecting this broader proposal, the ABA left in place restrictions that prevent
lawyers from acting even where clients' fraudulent acts stand to have devastating and
far-reaching consequences for the well-being of innocent third parties-and even
where the lawyer's own sense of justice would otherwise lead him to disclose despite
the personal consequences of so doing. By foreclosing this possibility, the ABA
signaled its commitment to the standard view, on which the moral compass of the
lawyer is set by the client, not internally by the lawyer herself.
185. Lawyers who decide to disclose client confidences even when allowed to do so
under a discretionary rule stand to pay a considerable professional price, but they are
at least not liable to bar discipline or vulnerable to a malpractice claim for so doing.
Nor must they reckon with the thought that in so disclosing they are violating an
accepted professional norm. The advantage of discretionary rules is that such rules
would signal to lawyers that the profession respects the judgment of lawyers and that
it is up to each lawyer to exercise this discretion responsibly and with integrity.
186. Rhode, supra note 2, at 66-67.
187. See, e.g., R. 5.2(b) (2000) (assuring junior lawyers that they will not be held in
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if despite disagreement as to their
professional obligations they defer to a supervisor's "reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty").
188. See, e.g., id.
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protect clients from renegade lawyers whose moral conceptions put
them outside the mainstream. But to the degree that these rules cabin
lawyers' discretion and allow for only the most restrictive exceptions,
they also prevent the moral deliberation and principled action that are
the hallmarks of the person of integrity.
I am not, it bears emphasizing, suggesting that, at each moment of
their professional lives, lawyers should be prepared to evaluate the
moral implications of any given action. Such an approach to legal
practice would be impracticable, not to mention that it would yield a
profession of serial civil disobedients whose clients would be unable
collectively to trust in their lawyers' professional guarantees. 8 9 At the
same time, however, it seems imperative that lawyers, if they are to
retain a moral compass and develop the traits of integrity, retain a
critical perspective on the actions they take on behalf of their clients,
including the implications of guarding the confidences they are called
upon to keep. 190
There is a further respect in which the rules are at odds with the
possibility of integrity on the part of lawyers, and that is the extent to
which the substance of certain provisions reveals a greater concern
with the self-interest of the profession than a meaningful commitment
to the values and principles on which they are alleged to be based.
Again, consider ABA Model Rule 1.6, governing the duty of
confidentiality. Absent client consent, this rule flatly forbids lawyers
189. My point here is not that lawyers should pick and choose the moments when
they will be morally reflective, but simply that one can expect there to be in practice
many everyday moments that implicate no significant moral consequences and thus
with respect to which no such reflection will be necessary. My own sense is that once
one is attuned to the possible need for moral deliberation arising from one's
professional actions, it will become obvious when instances arise that require this kind
of deliberation, leaving the lawyer otherwise free to attend to the day-to-day without
the fear of moral violation.
190. When client aims conflict with a lawyers' moral sense, lawyers do have options
besides abandoning their clients or unilaterally frustrating their purposes. Most
obviously, there is much room on this perspective for engaging the client in discussion
about the appropriateness or implications of their actions, a strategy consistent with
the understanding of the lawyer as advisor or counselor and which even the ABA
Model Rules affirm as fully consistent with the lawyer's role. See e.g., R. 2.1
(recognizing that counseling clients will at times require reference "not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation"). I say "even the ABA Model Rules"
because, as commentators have shown, despite the language in the preamble to the
effect that a lawyer is an "officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality of justice" as well as "a representative of clients,"
see pmbl., the substance of the rules is considerably more heavily weighted to the last
of these roles than the first two. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the
Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 39 (1989); see also Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA
Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639 (1981) (arguing that the selfregulatory structure of the bar, which allows those lawyers who are governed by the
rules to determine their content, means that the substance of those rules will be
invariably weighted toward promoting the professional interests of lawyers as a
group).
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to disclose client confidences-defined broadly as any "information
relating to representation" -unless one of two exceptions is met.19'
The first exception grants lawyers the discretion to disclose in cases
where doing so would "prevent the client from committing a criminal
act the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm."'" This exception is plainly quite narrow,
requiring not merely that the threat prompting disclosure be one that
a lawyer "reasonably" believes "likely" to lead to death or serious
physical harm, but that the source of the threat be a possible criminal
act by one's client.193 Its scope might be presumed to signal the high
priority that the profession places on protecting client confidences,
and the high moral price, in terms of possible considerable harm to
third parties or the public interest, that lawyers are consequently
willing to pay in order that these confidences be held inviolate. Yet it
is hard to square this reading with the second exception to the
lawyer's general duty of confidentiality articulated in Rule 1.6, which
allows a lawyer to disclose client confidences in order "to establish a
claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer" when he is accused, whether
by others or by the client themselves, of misconduct relating to the
representation. 194 Certainly, it is not unreasonable in general that a
lawyer should be able to defend himself against "a criminal charge or
civil claim... based upon conduct in which the client was involved," if
it is reasonably believed that, without the lawyer's knowledge or
consent, the client used the lawyer's services toward ends that might
subject the lawyer to such liability. 195 Nor are the drafters wrong when
they insist that a lawyer who has worked for a client in good faith is

191. See R. 1.6 (b).
192 See R. 1.6(b)(1). As noted above, see supra note 184, in August of 2001 the
ABA House of Delegates approved, but has not yet formally adopted, a new version
of this rule which would allow disclosure "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." R.
1.6(b)(1) (approved amended draft 2001). This revision is welcome and certainly
expands the lawyer's discretion to reveal client confidences, but this change does not
in my view undermine the point I am making here, that the narrow scope of the
exceptions to the duty implies a strong commitment to confidentiality whatever the
consequences. See R. 1.6(b)(2); R. 1.6(b)(5) (approved amended draft 2001).
Because the point is made either way, I rely for ease of reference on the current rule
notwithstanding that its revision is imminent.
193. See R. 1.6(b)(1) (2000).
194. R. 1.6(b)(2). Specifically, this provision allows a lawyer to reveal client
confidences
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client.
ld.
195. See R. 1.6 cmt.
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entitled to a fee. 196 But where the rule protects these interests on the

part of lawyers while refusing to allow disclosure even where
analogous third party interests are at stake-as, for example, in the
recent refusal of the ABA House of Delegates to approve a further
exception to the rule allowing disclosure where doing so would
prevent or mitigate "substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another" 19-it is hard to credit the claim that the
parameters of the duty of confidentiality are defined primarily by
lawyers' commitment to ensuring an effective adversary system.'98
Instead, it begins to seem as if lawyers' own self-interest dictates the
shape of this rule, allowing lawyers to justify the loyalty to client
interests against almost all moral claims (a loyalty for which clients are
willing to pay nicely), while exempting lawyers from this duty when
such loyalty would exact a personal cost.199
196. See id. ("A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(2) to prove
the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the
principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the
detriment of the fiduciary.").
197. R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (proposed amended draft 2001), available at http:/www.
abanet.orgcpr/e2k-complete-amend.html. This proposal was voted down at the ABA
House of Delegates meeting in August 2001, suggesting that it is only the financial
interests of lawyers and not third parties that could justify violating client confidences.
198. The most commonly cited justification for the duty of confidentiality rests on
the importance for the success of the adversary system that there be open channels of
communication between lawyer and client so that the lawyer be fully informed of all
he needs to provide effective representation. The idea is that if it were not for the
lawyer's commitment to keeping a client's confidences, the client would not trust the
lawyer sufficiently to tell him all relevant details of the case, thus hampering the
lawyer's capacity to represent the client's interests fully. R. 1.6 cmt. (2000) ("The
observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential
information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to
proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal
assistance."); see also id. ("A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is
that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation.
The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer
even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter."). The force of this
justification, however, is open to question, particularly in light of empirical evidence
suggesting that many clients do not base their decisions as to what information to
confide in their attorneys on knowledge of the lawyer's duty of confidentiality, see
Rhode & Luban, supra note 1, at 190 (citing Eric Slater & Anita Sorenson, Corporate
Legal Ethics-An Empirical Study, 8 J. Corp. L. 601, 622 (1983); Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 382-83 (1989); Note, Functional
Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals,71 Yale L.J. 1226, 1232 (1962)),
and testimony by some lawyers that they do their best not to know all that their client
knows, because such calculated ignorance enables them to provide a more successful
defense. See Kenneth Mann, Defending White Collar Crime 103-23 (1985), quoted in
Rhode & Luban, supra note 1, at 311-18.
199. This apparent disconnect between the stated value motivating the rule and the
way the rule operates in practice is seen in other rules governing lawyer's conduct.
Rule 3.3, for example, is intended to reflect a lawyer's duty of candor to the court
arising out of the lawyer's role as officer of the court, yet it requires lawyers to
disclose only that legal authority that directly controls and is "directly adverse to the
position of the client," thus exempting a range of authority that does not fit these
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Why is this a problem from the perspective of integrity? As we
have seen, the possibility of integrity requires among other things an
honesty with self and others as to one's motives and ends, and the
willingness to act on one's stated commitments even where doing so
runs counter to one's own self-interest. To the extent that the rules
governing lawyers' conduct seem in substance to be more about
promoting lawyers' self-interest than the values alleged to underpin
them, they are inconsistent with these requirements, indicating instead
a system-wide hypocrisy as to lawyers' motivations, and priorities
designed to improve the profession's image without incurring the
expense of actually living up to stated principles.
There is, of course, a danger to granting lawyers greater discretion
under the rules to exercise their own judgment as to how to proceed in
a given case: They might use this discretion in ways that compromise,
rather than further, the interests of justice. The concern here is not
that lawyers might reasonably differ as to the principles of justice they
embrace and thus that the outcomes that result from the principled
exercise of discretion by some may not cohere with conceptions of
justice more widely held; that possibility, as we have seen,' is
inherent in any ethic that recognizes, as Rhode's does, the legitimacy
of a range of moral views, and is in itself no affront to justice. No, the
danger posed by affording lawyers greater discretion under the rules is
of a different order, and reflects not good faith disagreement as to
what justice requires, but the very real likelihood that some lawyers,
given the chance, would use the opening such discretion would create
to gain an advantage for themselves or their clients, even at the
expense of the system or unprotected third parties. The ethical
justification for such an approach, if there is one, would likely be
found in what might be called extreme zealous advocacy,2 ' which has
narrow parameters yet may nonetheless be highly relevant and necessary in order that
the court have a full picture of the governing precedent. See R. 3.3(a)(3) ("A lawyer
shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client
and not disclosed by opposing counsel."). Indeed, it was only in the recent revisions
of the Model Rules that the drafters modified the rule so that any false statement to
the court, and not merely that which is "material," would constitute a violation of a
lawyer's duty of candor. Compare R.3.3(a) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly make a
false statement of materialfact or law to a tribunal.") (emphasis added) with R.3.3(a)
(approved amended draft 2001) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal."); see also Gaetke, supra note 190
(demonstrating generally the limited extent to which the current version of the Model
Rules substantively embodies the notion that a lawyer is an officer of the court);
Deborah Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 702-06 (1981) (arguing that the prohibitions on
advertising and solicitation are more about lawyers protecting their monopoly than
about vindicating the values and ends offered to justify them).
200. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
201. This extreme version of the lawyer's role is broadly justified on the ground
that it reflects the duty lawyers owe their clients, but my sense is that this proffered
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already for many lawyers squiaezed out of the accepted view of
lawyers' obligations any possible duties as officer of the court or
"trustee[] of the public good '?2 Given this danger, it might be
thought better to have rules ofApjrofessional conduct that set a clear
floor below which a lawyer may not sink and hope that lawyers will at
least follow the rules, than to &dratediscretion that will be consistently
turned to the client's advantage even at the expense of the interests of
justice more broadly.
With the recognition of this danger, we decisively turn-as was
inevitable-from the construction of an ideal theory to consideration
of the existing prospects for, and obstacles to, its implementation.
Above, I defended the value of articulating ethical ideals to which we
can aspire and against which we can measure our own behavior, and I
remain committed to that endeavor. But it is also true that ethical
theory untethered from reality will be ultimately unconvincing and
easy to dismiss. So I believe it is not only appropriate but also
necessary to identify here the feature of current legal practice that to
my mind represents-both in its raw form and to the extent that it
informs the practice structures in which many lawyers operate and
develop their professional identities-the single greatest obstacle to
the possibility of integrity: the prioritizing of profit maximization.
Obviously, lawyers need and deserve to make a living, and there is no
reason from the perspective of integrity why that living should not be
a comfortable one. But where the structures and norms of legal
practice are molded around the single-minded pursuit of profit, we
can routinely expect that both the development and exercise of the
character traits that compris6: integrity will become stifled, and
eventually-as we saw above,'! 'our discussion of the confidentiality
rules-atrophy with disuse.
To see why this is so, consider the likely effects of the prioritizing of
profit on the way a lawyer might approach the representation of a
paying client, a client the lawyer has an interest-a financial interestin keeping happy and satisfied. First, in this posture, the lawyer is
likely to defer to the client's view as to the goals of the representation,
to see herself as the conduit for achieving the client's preferences
rather than a moral agent in her own right who might bring to the
table her own views as to what the just or appropriate result might be.
And this is so even where the client's goals might have morally
justification frequently masks what is more correctly viewed as actions taken to
promote the lawyer's own interests-which frequently, although not always, line up
on the same side. In this form, zealous advocacy is wholly inconsistent with the
exercise of integrity, which as we have .seen presupposes among other things honesty
with one's self and others as to onrk motives and a willingness to act on stated
principles even at the expense of self-interest.
202. See Kronman, supra note 149, at 32 ("A lawyer who is doing his job well
dwells in the tension between private iterest and public good, and never overcomes
it.").
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questionable effects, or skate close to the legal line, or where their
realization would require strategies likely to undermine, rather than
enhance, the "core values" of "honesty, fairness, and good faith on
which the [justice] system depends."'
A lawyer might, for example,
in the interests of keeping her client happy and defending against a
meritorious claim by a sympathetic plaintiff, take advantage of the
vulnerable plaintiff who is temporarily without (or with incompetent)
counsel and set the plaintiff's deposition at a place and time difficult
for that party to get to, and, when the witness fails to appear, to have
the case dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Or, in the
interests of protecting a high-paying corporate client on the verge of
bankruptcy, a lawyer might vociferously and zealously defend the
client's financial soundness before the regulatory body responsible for
certifying the client for continued federal deposit insurance, even
though continued insurance of an insolvent bank would only
dramatically drive up the already very large bill the taxpayers would
eventually receive for the bail-out when the bank ultimately fails, and
despite the fact that the regulatory process as designed explicitly relies
on the candor and good faith of the attorneys as well as the clients.2 1
Or, for similar reasons, a lawyer might continue to certify the legality
of dubious accounting or investment practices, and even, when the
client is at risk of being investigated for those practices, subtly advise
that incriminating documents be destroyed rather than retained and
turned over to the investigating authorities when lawfully requested.3
Of course, the actions of a lawyer seeking to keep a client happy and
ensure continued fees need not take such a dramatic form as these
examples provide. The point is simply that, where the lawyer's
priority is the securing of profit for himself or his firm, he is apt to
take actions that further the stated interests of the client even where

203. Rhode supra note 2, at 67.
204. See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 160, at 1-2 (recounting the story of -Laura
Bernardi, a senior associate at a large urban law firm" who, apparently in order to
enhance her partnership prospects, got rid of a case in which a smoking gun memo
incriminated her client in precisely the way described in the text).
205. See In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays, and Handler: A Symposium
on Government Regulation, Lawyers' Ethics, and the Rule of Law: Introduction, 66 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 977, 979-83 (1993), quoted in Rhode & Luban, supra note 1, at 228.
206. As of now, it is not clear whether Enron's lawyers played roles on this order in
the events leading up to the spectacular failure of that corporation, but early evidence
offers reason to suspect that they did so. For discussion on this question of the role
the lawyers appear at this early stage to have played in the drama of Enron's collapse,
see Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of a Profession in Paralysis, 54 Stan. L. Rev.
(forthcoming July 2002); see also Mann, supra note 198 (describing the "avoidance
techniques" adopted by white collar criminal defense attorneys through which they
avoid learning of their clients' circumstances while managing to convey-without
saying so explicitly and thus risking subsequent legal exposure themselves-that it
might be in their clients' interests to dispose of any potentially incriminating
documents relevant to the impending prosecution).
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those interests require actions or yield effects that are counter to the
interests of justice, even as the lawyer himself were to conceive them.
This deference to the preferences and perspective of the client
compromises the development and exercise of the lawyer's integrity in
multiple ways. As we have just seen, it leads the lawyer to take
actions that may well be contrary to her own conception of justice. It
furthermore discourages the lawyer even from deliberating as to her
own view as to what justice might require in a given circumstance-an
approach that, as we have already seen, is central to the possibility of
lawyering with integrity-to avoid a situation in which her own
conclusions are trumped by the contrary conclusions of the client. To
keep the client happy, the lawyer will learn to view grants of
discretion, whether provided by the rules or by the system more
broadly, as providing opportunities for furthering her client's
interests, even where this approach, if adopted by all parties operating
within the system, would ultimately compromise the legitimacy and
long-term health of the system itself. Whether a lawyer could, under
these circumstances, maintain over the long-term a clear sense of her
own values and commitments is a question that in the universe of
deference to the client matters little, and indeed the lawyer herself
might have an interest in developing a perspective more consonant
with that of her clients, in order to minimize any cognitive dissonance
or psychological discomfort that might arise from continually acting
contrary to her own principles. In this universe, questions as to the
meaning of the lawyer's obligations as "officer of the legal system" or
"public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice" 2' become irrelevant. In short, lawyers whose practices are
organized around the priority of profit-maximization seem likely to
engage in an ongoing strategy of deference to clients in a way that
compromises, 208 rather than enhances, the possibilities for the exercise
and development of the various traits
of character that we have seen
29
to comprise the quality of integrity.

207. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct pmbl. (2000).
208. The lawyer, of course, is not rescued from this conclusion by redescribing her
moral commitments as those that prioritize self-interest, for as we have seen selfinterest is not a principle that can be applied consistently to all parties, and thus is not
one that can consistently form the motivation of a person of integrity. See supra notes
118-131 and accompanying text.
209. It may well be, as Rhode argues, that clients whose lawyers have a reputation
for integrity will stand to benefit from the greater trust and spirit of cooperation with
which opposing counsel and other relevant parties like regulatory agencies will
approach dealings with them. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 70; see also Steven Bennett,
Talk Tough, But Don't Be a Jerk, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 24, 2000, at 11 (discussing the
relationship between a lawyer's reputation in the legal community and his
professional success). But this suggestion seems unpersuasive as a reason why
lawyers who have not already sought to develop a reputation for integrity ought to do
so. For if it were the case that greater integrity would yield greater profitability for
lawyers, it seems reasonable to expect that lawyers would have already begun to
practice in this way.
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The discussion thus far has assumed that the compromise of the
lawyer's development and exercise of integrity in these various ways
occurs as a result of the lawyer's own personal decision to show
excessive deference to the interests and preferences of the client as a
profit-maximizing strategy. But as anyone familiar with the structure
of legal practice is well aware, for many lawyers-especially young
lawyers new to the profession-the pressure to shape one's approach
to practice in ways consistent with the goal of profit maximization is
less likely to be generated internally than it is to come from higherups in the firm, that is, from firm partners. 210 For many lawyers, that
is, the possibilities for developing a professional identity consistent
with integrity in the ways explored above are undermined from the
start by the pressure from employers to increase a firm's profitability,
a pressure that in today's market generally manifests itself as pressure
to prioritize billing hours over all other considerations. At large
urban firms in particular, it is currently standard for associates to meet
official targets of 2000 hours per year and, privately, associates report
pressure to bill 2400 hours or more. The average for those associates
on the partner track are even higher than this. Indeed, at some firms,
associates report that a junior lawyer billing 3000 hours per year
"hardly raises eyebrows."211
From the perspective of integrity, these numbers raise a number of
concerns, most obviously that of overreporting. There are only so
many hours in a day and, given widely cited estimates that the average
lawyer spends approximately three hours in the office for every two
hours billed, 21 2 on average a lawyer billing 2400 hours a year must be
at work for 3600 hours in a twelve-month period.1 3 Billing at this
210. Zitrin & Langford, supra note 160, at 81 ("Even after accounting for health
insurance and other benefits and the cost of support staff, the [associates] of the legal
world are major profit centers for their firms.").
211. Ross Guberman, Running from the Law, Washingtonian, Oct. 2001, at 52 ("In
the 1970s, associates [at the Los Angeles office of Latham & Watkins] billed about

1,400 hours a year, in the 1980s, 1,800 was the target at even the largest firms. But at

today's Latham & Watkins, billing 2,300 hours is typical, and 3,000 hardly raises
eyebrows."); see also Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes from a Law Firn, 50 Rutgers L Rev.

2153, 2154-55 (1998) (recounting the experiences of law firm associate "Nicholas

Farber," who reported that the official target for associates at his firm of about fifty

associates and a third as many partners in a "medium-sized town" was 2000 hours a
year, but that "[t]hose who got significant bonuses typically billed well over 2000" and
that "the highest number of hours a lawyer at the firm billed in a year was 2600");
Cameron Stracher, Double Billing: A Young Lawyer's Tale of Greed, Sex, Lies and
the Pursuit of a Swivel Chair 58 (1998) (reporting that "plenty of lawyers" at the New
York firm where he was a young associate "billed more than two thousand hours [a
year]").
212. William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 Rutgers L
Rev. 1, 14 (1991); Patrick Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and EthicalMember of
an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L Rev. 871, 894 n.166

(1999).

213. Cf.Rhode, supra note 2, at 171 ("To generate two thousand billable hours,

attorneys typically need to work ten hours a day, six days a week.").
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level thus requires a lawyer to be in the office-or at some other

location for purposes of work-for close to ten hours a day, seven
days a week, 365 days a year.214 Surveying these numbers, one cannot
help wondering whether lawyers billing at these levels are capable of
doing so honestly. Is an hour billed really an hour worked? Although
there is little available by way of systematic evidence of widespread
fraud, anecdotal evidence of overbilling by associates at large firms
reported by a number of authors is not encouraging,215 particularly
from a perspective, like the one we have developed here, that places a
premium on lawyers' honesty, fair-dealing, and "moral
trustworthiness. '216 But even apart from the possibility of fraud, and
214. Even a less ambitious associate, seeking only 2100 hours in annual billables,
must put in over 8.5 hours a day, every day of every month, to meet this target.
215. Widely cited techniques for increasing the number of hours billed beyond
those actually worked include "time-sheet padding" (inflating or inventing the
number of hours actually worked), Guberman, supra note 211, at 52; see also Ross,
supra note 212, at 15 (discussing Lisa Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
659, 705, 709-10 (1990), in which the author reports an informal study on "deception
in billing practices" in which one respondent "described a firm in which it was
common to bill twenty hours per day, even if the attorneys had worked only ten
hours"); "recycl[ing]" work (billing a client the full length of time taken to perform a
task - for example, drafting a memo on a legal question or preparing a contract - that
had already been done and fully paid for by a prior client), Rhode, supra note 2, at
173; Zitrin & Langford, supra note 160, at 83; Ross, supra note 212, at 83-88; "double
billing" or even "triple billing" (billing two or three clients for a single hour, whether
by producing work relevant to each and/or by charging one client for a task (e.g.,
traveling) that allows one to work simultaneously for a second client), Rhode, supra
note 2, at 173; Zitrin & Langford, supra note 160, at 83-84; Lerman, supra note 211, at
2159 (interviewing one former associate who reported being encouraged by partners
at his firm to double and triple bill his time by "find[ing] a way to do three things in
that hour[,] [t]hen... bill three different hours to three different clients"); adjusting
upward (compensating "for hours and expenses" that one assumes he has forgotten),
see Rhode, supra note 2, at 171; delaying the recording of hours (because after much
time has passed it is easier to exaggerate how much time one spent working and how
little time one spent on breaks), Ross, supra note 212, at 15 (quoting one California
attorney who described "filling out time sheets" as "the most creative professional
activity" of many lawyers (citing Kirsch, How Do I Bill This?, 5 Cal. Lawyer 15, 17
(Apr. 1985))); and exploiting minimum increments (so that "four two-minute phone
calls" in a system with a fifteen-minute minimum increment becomes one hour
billed), Schiltz, supra note 212, at 919. Certainly, some of these techniques are more
ethically troubling than others. Inventing or inflating one's hours so that clients are
billed for time not worked, for example, seems to me blatantly fraudulent, while many
attorneys (and certainly many law students, if the several classes with which I have
discussed this question are any indication) have less difficulty, morally speaking, with
double billing, at least where one client is being billed for travel time for which they
would have paid anyway. But see William G. Ross, The Honest Hour: The Ethics of
Time-Based Billing by Attorneys 81-82 (1996) (arguing that "the only forms of double
billing that are even arguably ethical occur when a lawyer travels for one client and
bills another client for work performed during the trip or when a lawyer works for
one client while being forced to wait on the business of another client" and noting
that "[t]here are few other situations in which an attorney can perform two distinct
services for two different clients at the same time").
216. Graham, supra note 79, at 246; see also supra notes 114-122 and accompanying
text.
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the worries about the quality of work performed by someone who has
been working sixteen-hour days for days or weeks on end,217 the
pressures placed in law firms on associates (and partners) to maintain
their billables pose the very real likelihood that the professional
identity developed in this context will resemble not so much Rhode's
ethical lawyer, who carefully reflects on the interests at stake and the
likely consequences of particular actions in light of his own values and
principles and ultimately accepts "personal responsibility for the
moral consequences of [his] professional actions," 28 but rather a
lawyer who views the exercise of professional judgment solely through
the lens of personal advancement-assuming he has any time
available to exercise his professional judgment at all. This result may,
of course, be a feature of practice in any large organization in which
junior lawyers are removed from the decision-making process, but my
sense is that it is particularly likely in contexts where the primary
metric of associate performance is the number of hours billed
annually. Even when a junior associate is part of the decision-making
process, in a firm culture where billable hours are supreme, any
decisions she makes will ultimately be directed toward, not what
justice would require or what is consistent with her own values and
principles, but rather toward what is most likely to increase her
billables and enhance her status at the firm.
In such circumstances, where the desire for profit or the pressure to
bill is great, even those lawyers who have retained a sense of their
own moral commitments are likely to give into what Lynne McFall
calls the "temptation to redescription. ' 21 9 Not wanting to miss an
opportunity to feather his own nest-or the nest of his employersthe lawyer will redraft his own principles or construct a late-breaking
exception to them to accommodate the conclusion he wants to reach
in the present case. This move is plainly counter to the spirit of the
model of ethical lawyering we have here been exploring, which
depends upon a high level of self-knowledge, honesty about motives,
and an absence-or at least a minimum-of self-deception. As
McFall suggests, one who admits his motives and nonetheless decides
the question in a way consistent with his self-interest has certainly
shown "weakness of the will," which is "one contrary of integrity."2"
But it is the person "who sells out, then fixes the books" whose loss of
integrity is greater," and this description seems particularly apt when
applied to the person who redrafts his principles to justify actions that
privilege profit over ethical consistency.
217.
bleary,
21&
219.
220.
221.

See Rhode, supra note 2, at 35 ("Clients do not get efficient services from
burned-out lawyers.").
Id. at 66-67.
McFaU, supra note 75, at 7.
Id
Id.
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I have already suggested that ethical lawyering on the contextual
model is necessarily an individual ethic, one that offers guidance as to
the nature of ethical practice and leaves it up to each individual
lawyer whether she will choose to follow. In addition, I have
suggested that whether or not an individual lawyer has the inclination
or capacity to make this choice will depend to a great extent not only
on her own moral qualities or character but on the nature of the
professional context in which she works. It now appears that, to the
extent that lawyers develop their professional identity -and thus their
commitments-in professional structures that emphasize the pursuit
of profit to the exclusion of all other values, such lawyers will be
unlikely, and perhaps even unable, to develop or enhance the moral
qualities that make it possible to lawyer with integrity.
CONCLUSION

The guiding premise of this article has been that no theory of legal
ethics is complete without addressing the question of what traits of
character lawyers must possess to enable the ethical fulfillment of
their professional obligations. With this premise in mind, I have
sought in this article to fill out the model of ethical lawyering put
forward by Deborah Rhode in her recent book In the Interests of
Justice, with the aim not only of developing a richer sense of a
lawyer's ethical obligations on this model, but also of generating an
understanding of the particular character traits that would make it
possible for a lawyer to live up to these obligations as Rhode
conceives them. Simply put, my conclusion in this regard has been
that Rhode's conception of ethical lawyering amounts to a call for
lawyering with integrity.
This conclusion, as the discussion in Part III of this article suggests,
offers those committed to enhancing the possibilities for ethical
lawyering on Rhode's model both a practical focus and reason for
pessimism. Practically speaking, if there is something to my claim that
the quality of integrity is central to the possibility of ethical lawyering,
it suggests an appropriate course of action for its promotion: the
fostering among practicing lawyers of the character traits commonly
associated with people of integrity. At the same time, however, there
is reason for pessimism as to the likely success of such efforts,
particularly given the incompatibility that I have argued exists
between the possibility of integrity and the prioritizing by lawyers of
the goal of profit maximization.
It bears emphasizing that the tension I identify between ethical
behavior and profit maximization is not exclusive to Rhode's model of
ethical lawyering. To the contrary, this tension exists even for zealous
advocates on the standard conception, who routinely face the
temptation to privilege their own financial self-interest at the expense
of the client. Rather, what this inevitable tension suggests is
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something with which anyone familiar with the temptations and
pressures of legal practice is already well aware, which is that all
practicing lawyers, and not merely those drawn to Rhode's model,
must choose between ethical practice and an exclusive commitment to
profit maximization. 2 Individual lawyers are, of course, free to
choose the latter, but in doing so they must also relinquish their part
in the grand vision, of which lawyers are justly proud, of a profession
comprised of "high priest[s] at the shrine of justice," z 3 "trustees... of
the public good." 2 4 Just as there is no integrity where one is solely
concerned with oneself and one's own interests, there is no valid claim
to conform to the profession's highest ideals where one acts solely to
increase one's profits or advance one's career.
But even the commitment of individual lawyers to ethical lawyering
does not get us all the way there, for as we have seen, the cultivation
of integrity also requires institutional support. It is for this reason
that, I believe, no amount of exhortation or civility codes or calls for
moral renewal issued by the bar will bring about the ethical change
that appears to be sorely lacking in the American legal profession.P
To this end, we need something less easily won: a broad-based
collective commitment to meaningful institutional change.

222. Note that a choice of the former does not at all preclude lawyers from earning
a profit. It is the pursuit of profit to the exclusion of all other values that would be in
this way ruled out.
223. ABA, Report of the Committee of the Code of ProfessionalEthics, 1906 ABA
Rep. 600-04, quoted in Rhode & Luban, supra note 1, at 65.
224. See Kronman, supra note 149, at 32.
225. See Gordon, supra note 206.
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